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Juli 1991

"General Gehlen and the Americans"
as viewed by a German Participant

Speech delivered May 10th, 1991
at The American Institute for
Contemporary German Studies,
The Johns Hopkins University.

1. There are several reasons why I gladly followed your invitation to participate at this presentation and discussion and to comment on Mary Ellen Reese's book:

first and foremost it is the expression of my deep attachment to the relationship with the United States, and to what our alliance stands for.

second I would like to show my friendship to my American friends with whom our partnership developed through these early years, at the very beginning of our alliance.

As time goes by some of the closest friends have left us.

With Tom Lucid and John Bross I shared an experience unique both professionally and in our private lives.

third it gives me an opportunity to state in a distinguished circle - and publicly - my immense satisfaction to have participated in this joint venture. We were present at the creation of the American-German-Partnership which has matured in sun and wind.

In conveying these thoughts to you I would like to stress that 45 years ago something has been started of which you Americans can pride yourself: turning an enemy - and a thoroughly beaten one - into an ally, developing a democratic canvas within a totally destroyed and hitherto totalitarian structured country, enhancing the security of the West, laying the groundwork for a lasting alliance.

The Org Gehlen was a part of these first and formative steps: it spearheaded the future close relationship in the security and military field.

2. The publication of Mary Ellen Reese's book and the growing interest in revelations about this period show that the time has come to appreciate that those gentlemen on either side who were instrumental in bringing all that about have not only contributed to a remarkable success-story, the Americans involved have actually taken responsibilities far beyond their positions and authority

Men can prove themselves, respond to the challenges, if the horizon is open and the ground untreaden (something by the way, cavalry officers have been educated to cope with!) Such was the situation in the late fourties.

For any historian it is a rarely achieved endeavour to catch the "Zeitgeist" and the mixture of motivations of the dramatis personae even if less than two generations ago. Mostly one has to confine oneself to factual, written, material and to follow traces which are sometimes leading into accidental directions.

40 years: far enough receded for simplifications and established opinions having taken hold; still too close not to have witnesses, even participants, around with all their varying points of view complicating the picture.

Apropos the "Zeitgeist": how revealing that Russian historians, inspired by Glasnost, put the unleashing of the Cold War squarely on Stalins shoulders: he thus provoked the reaction by the West, eventually leading to the selfdefeating competition the outcome of which we have witnessed.

A belated justification for our so called Cold Warriors!

Remember those arguments? But neither the allegations about an "exaggerated Soviet Threat" by Gehlen and his men nor the

excuses offered about the "unfortunate political-tactical errors by Stalin", nor even the appreciation of a "deep-rooted Russian urge for security" could explain the facts away: it was a continuing aggressive military build-up, just that!-

(It is tempting - but should be left to another occasion - to analyse the socio-political threads and patterns emerging in postwar Germany and to explore the various and differing approaches of the Allies towards the groupings of the political spectrum.

Oddly enough - but maybe not so unusual - some of these circles onto whom the Americans made a special effort or felt a stronger affinity turned out in later years to be the most critical, even breeding anti-Americanism)

Within these pitfalls between different and controversial opinions along the road to "objectivity" Mary Ellen Reese has tread with considerable skill not only in her factual research, but - and that I value even higher - in her grasp of people and motives. Her feeling for the historic environment - reaching out well beyond the easy cliches, finding her way through the maze of interlocking events, of individual or collective axes to grind, of prejudices and distortions - is truly remarkable. (The latter is f.i. evident in the Zolling/Höhne book "The General was a Spy" which first appeared in the German magazine "Der Spiegel" as a serial at a time of intense political infighting following the end of the Adenauer- and the beginning of the Brandt-Era. The picture given of Gehlen is heavily biased because of obvious political motives.) And almost two decades earlier - as Mary Ellen's thorough research reveals -- there existed a widespread resentment

within the American military, foremost the CIC, towards the emerging political role of the CIA and a strong distrust of this "semi-independent" German Organization. (Of CIC's clandestine operation CAMPUS we only heard many years later.

Cooperation could have prevented a lot of damage!).

Add to all these aspects the prevailing tendency for revisionism - looking at the past with standards of the present - and you can value what Mary Ellen has achieved. Her book makes fascinating reading - not often found in books about this genre.

3. My contribution in describing these formative years could be to offer some reflexions from my personal point de vue, thus hoping to complete the picture by letting a German participant speak. This is not "the other side of the coin" because we were on the same side, its rather a complementary view - something I believe should have been included in the first place. -

In doing so I will confine myself to the essentials. -

The people who joined Gehlen at the inception were of a homogenous background, and- remarkably so: men and women, both the higher echelons and the secretary-level, had their roots in what we might call upper-middle-class-families of mostly traditional upbringing. The military career was a natural choice; it had put them apart from the Nazi-Party at whose functionaries they looked with disdain. Many deceived themselves up to the bitter end - like, by the way, a majority of those in the population who were

critical of the Nazi-regime - by making a difference between Hitler on the one side and his Myrmidones.-This was a view shared by many foreign politicians of the time, a tendency often found in analogue constellations up to this day.

General von Seeckt's beneficiary order, prohibiting any membership in the political parties of the Weimar Republic, was upheld throughout Hitler's reign (up to the failed coup of 1944) - thus putting an agreeable distance between the Army and the Nazi-Party (a fundamental difference - this should be noted - to the Communist practice).

Many of us younger officers had made their professional choice because the military was the only meaningful career where a party-membership and -involvement was even forbidden, whilst as a lawyer, public servant, in the academic professions (except, may be, medicine), even in free enterprise, party-membership could not be easily avoided; and it came in handy for the career. Anyway, after long hours of soul-searching with my parents I decided to make my career in the Army and so became a cavalry officer. Looking back, I realize, that this life, the Esprit de Corps in the regiment, away in the war and all the years at the front made us live in a sort of National Park - in this case protected from the Wildlife outside our world!

This explains, I think, the fact that the decision to eliminate the political leadership - not heard of in German history - could only emerge from those officers, who by their personal experience or their position and insight were confronted with the recklessness and criminality of the Dictator himself.

After failing in their plan of 1938 to arrest Hitler and bring him to court (!), later, in the total effort of an all-out-war only a few had the daring spirit that the only solution was to kill the Head of State. Some of the best among them had to overcome their deeprooted belief in the holiness of their oath, which by long tradition tied them to the person at the top. The "Tyrannenmord" has been an exceptional and rare event throughout history; the very few who crossed the threshold - be ready to stand up and die - were heroes, but in their general set of mind they were not different from those who stayed behind or happened to be outside of the inner circle. - All these rather unique conditions have to be kept in mind in assessing the range of men and women gathering in Gehlen's Organization during these early years. -

There was a second common denominator: the awareness of the Threat of Communism as the driving force of the expansionist Soviet System, The roots of this deeply engraved belief went back to the fratricide days of the Weimar Republic; it had been an important factor in bringing the bourgeois majority into Hitler's camp.

Now, half of Germany was either lost or occupied by the Russian Army, the bordering states conquered and raped, the danger of a new war in Middle Europe was very present. The rapid withdrawal of the Allied troops after the hostilities - traditional pattern of Empires beyond the Sea - ended without resolving status and future of the states bordering the Soviet Union; certainly a costly mistake. -

For many of us it was no time to sit idly by.

Churchill wrote at a later date that by May 1945 he himself (like Montgomery) had considered rearming the German troops. At the same time Bedell Smith bade farewell to Sir Kenneth Strong stipulating to the latter's astonishment that the future main partner to cooperate with would now be the Soviets! He quickly learned.

Still, hadn't Gehlen succeeded in establishing this very balanced and special partnership - maybe not a "Magna Charta", yet the accepted and respected "Common Law" of the relationship - he wouldn't have won over and kept the support of so many qualified people. I remember clearly that those principles - called the Gentlemen Agreement - were decisive for our readiness to join the common effort. It had great appeal to join the side to which we belonged historically, in culture and religion, and in doing so to act in the national interest years before any German Government was eventually coming about. Therefore Gehlen's visiting of Adenauer and Schumacher in 1949 f.i. became very important to us: in agreeing, Chancellor and Leader of the Opposition both conveyed national authority and the above - party - status of the Organization.

4. There was a strong streak of patriotism and sense of history in Gehlen reminding me at several occasions of De Gaulle. Like the French statesman Gehlen struggled hard for his moral and political independence - as perceived by him. As with De Gaulle a lot of people didn't like it. Only a few

understood the motives - their "Fingerspitzengefühl" is much to be commended. Gehlen valued that, the longer the more, even if he didn't admit it. -

Like de Gaulle there was, on the other hand no wavering in matters of principle, of loyalty to the American partner and Ally (remember Berlin and Cuba!). -

Both, de Gaulle and Gehlen, mastered political tactics without being opportunists - a rare combination. Both shared or contributed with their Ally in an uninhibited way when independent, where they would have been difficult and defensive during the uneasy period of dependency! (Example: raw-reports forwarded directly from the collection - called "EBER"-Meldungen).

At this early stage we were also fascinated by the evolvement of Gehlen's vision, the integrated concept of one national intelligence service, uniting evaluation and collection and putting all means of collection under one responsibility. This unified structure emerged out of bitter experiences during the war: the total mess of the intelligence effort within the competing civilian-military-party-structure of the Third Reich!

Under the American trusteeship he really succeeded in combining the missions of the Abwehr, of FHO plus Frontaufklärung and of the Fernmeldeaufklärung - their functions as well as their personnel.

As I used to say: Admiral Canaris, General Fellgiebel (both victims of the plot!) and Gehlen himself were the Godfathers of the Organization. The impeccable reputation of Canaris influenced many a soldier to join this successor-organization.

Next to our early contribution to Western Security in dangerous times this concept of an integrated service is Gehlen's greatest achievement. His determination to carry it through explains many animosities and critical inner-political situations he had to cope with, up to and well into the final wholesale takeover - (friendly by the way) - of his Organization.

5. Most unfortunately, with the too hasty buildup of the networks, there have been Nazis creeping in from the sidelines, either through neglect or through sheer expediency.

This dark chapter takes on a dominant role in the second part of the book. As a matter of fact all western Intelligence or Security groups sinned in this direction - but we, as a German organization, we carried the burden of our past and should have - after the damage was done - ridden ourselves sooner and more decisively from those figures with a shady - in some cases criminal - past. Mostly, these people were at the fringes or around the Counter Intelligence effort, some were experts about the Balkans and active in the very special Austrian "Theatre of Spying". (Gehlen had become victim to his much cherished "compartmentation system".)

The one in Headquarters, Heinz Felfe, delivered a heavy blow to Gehlen personally and caused a lot of damage in the BND's East German network.

Could the entry of such a controversial sleezy character have been avoided? Only a total ban of former members to the RSHA

-whether cleared by denazification-courts or not - could have prevented also smaller fry such as Felke - he had been a police officer by career and received the usual GESTAPO-rank - from entering the Organization. But may be in his case there would have been a waiver since he had before served the British without reproach!

No excuse but an explanation: among Gehlen and his officers there were very few with experience and expertise in the CI/CE-field, both becoming so important in this postwar-period. The one's who had it where in the RSHA and its affiliated organizations. Later, with German Security Agencies in the Federal, State and Military areas firmly established, the own CI/CE-effort shrank to the necessary minimum of the proper needs of the Service.

Another blow to Gehlen was the ugly experience of the Spiegel-affair. It received highest publicity and caused innerpolitical turmoil. But little is known that the BND and his officers were totally exonerated: the informer to the Spiegel was somebody else, our man, a colonel, became a general after some water had flown down the Elbe river!

6. From my experience and perspective I have to say that these setbacks were a burden Gehlen had to carry - but it certainly was not the end of the BND nor of its leader. The integrated concept - evaluation, humint, elint, comint and the national code authority - proved itself and was not challenged any more; it became the envy of many a foreign service. In the mid-fifties, the BND had become a key-member of the tightly woven - strictly bilateral - canvas of Western Intelligence; he

broadened the approach both topical and geographical and was a most useful instrument for Germany's relations to the Third World.-

It served the BND well that the FRG as a medium power had no need for "active measures". Gehlen himself was strictly opposed to clandestine subversive operations if not as the integrated part of a political, may be military, action planned and executed by the government. He thought it irresponsible to induce people to activities which could only lead to their destruction.

7. To sum it up: The creation of a German Intelligence Service, its important role in alerting and informing the fledling Alliance about the Soviet Military Threat, the political aspect of the growing relationship, the capital of trust developed throughout decades past and towards challenges to come - what came out of the CIA-Gehlen-Connection is a success-story.

As a German participating at an early hour I look back with gratitude to our American friends; their political understanding and tact and their willingness to carry an often heavy responsibility has to be valued very highly indeed.

It's a past we share!

As Robert Stevenson put it:

The future is nothing, but the past
is myself, my own history, the seed
of my present thoughts, the mould
of my present disposition.

I will remember General Gehlen in a very personal way:
his foresight, dedication and preseverance have become
part of our history.

To Mr. Jim Chittelfield

remembering our close cooperation
over years and our close friendship
in common work

Berg, 12. 16. 71

Rimbert Jensen

Gentem

REINHARD GEHLEN

DER DIENST

Erinnerungen
1942 - 1971



v. HASE & KOEHLER VERLAG
MAINZ - WIESBADEN

Questions To Be Discussed

*These Questions were
Drafted in Florida, April 1978.*

II The Political Concept

My own first contact with the Doktor was in the autumn of 1948.

I know what he was at that time, including the political concept that was the basis for his ongoing actions at that time. But I do not fully understand how and when ~~these~~^{these} formed. In late 1948 the Doktor was committed to the concept that the world was polarizing between Communism--led by Russia--and the Free World led by the USA. He saw the Western Countries faced with the task of rebuilding under an economic, political and security roof structure provided by the USA. I never saw him waver from this basic view in the years that followed although at times his own ties with the USA were strained and cool. A United Western Europe was, from the beginning, necessary and inevitable in the Doktor's view if Western ideals and values were to survive the pressures that the Communist nations were to apply. Thus, the concept of a United Western Europe under U.S. hegemony constituted the basis of all political analysis and planning. Within this framework a rapprochement with France was for Germany the sine qua non of a move toward European Unity. By late 1948, the Doktor was already embarked on an active program of contact with the Swiss and the French. Under the cover of the "E Fall" the Doktor and Eric Waldman were actively in contact with the French--after the Americans, his first contact with the European enemies of Germany in WWII. No comparable initiatives had been taken with the British; in 1948 the Doktor appeared to view the British as an element of the potential opposition to his own aims. At that time he was highly skeptical that Britain would find its economic and political interests compatible with membership in a Western European Union or a "United States of Europe"--an expression heard often at that time in the Organization. This suspicion and skepticism was to remain a dominant element of the Doktor's thinking for several years more.

I do not have a clear impression of how this concept had evolved. Anecdotes I heard in Pullach suggested that as early as 1942 the Doktor had formulated judgements on the likely shape of the world after WWII and had discussed these privately--with Wessel among others.

It is now 30 years since I first met the Doktor and heard him articulately set forth his view of the post WWII world. Events since then have gone and are continuing to go much as he forecast although I felt at times that he expected another crisis in Europe to develop ~~some~~ somewhat more rapidly than it has. I would like to review with him some of the events that shaped his thinking prior to 1948 when I met him and, more important, to discuss with him where we are in the Western Alliance now and what he thinks the rest of this Century will bring. Will Western European Unity survive and grow? Will the British remain firmly associated with Europe? Has there been any fundamental change in the role of the USA vis a vis Europe?

II The European Connections After WWII

A. It is my impression that the liaison ties that the Doktor established with Western European and other intelligence and security services (neutrals and "Third World") were among the first ties between West Germany and the Free World after WWII; diplomatic, military and even economic ties followed. This was an era in which intelligence services played a more active role in shaping international relations than they do today. As I viewed the development of these ties from the Bormann Haus they fell into two categories: (1) those that remained in the German WWII alliance until fairly late in the war such as Spain, some of the Arabs, some of the neutrals etc. and (2) those Western European services that had their roots in the Western ~~Atlantic~~ Alliance. From the outset, we took a positive attitude on almost all of this activity, encouraged the Doktor to develop these liaisons in the form of bilateral relations between "the Organization" and the ~~individual~~ individual services and normally did not participate in substantive discussions. Normally these activities were carried out within the compound at Pullach and I and my staff participated in some part of the program--usually quasi-social. Particularly as the Adenauer Government began to have its own ties with Western European nations and we had entered the "cold in trust" period, these liaison ties obviously served an important purpose in the evolution of the Western European Community and the NATO alliance.

B. The British were among the last to come to Pullach. There is no doubt that British Intelligence viewed the Organization as bad news in postwar Europe, probably resented the fact that they had no role in this development and clearly had an overall political orientation vis a vis postwar Germany that reflected separate British interests and influences. Eventually agreement was reached among all parties--the Doktor, the British and us--that an official contact was necessary. This was staged at a lunch at the Godesbergerhof, as I remember, with Bill Steadman presented by the British to be their official contact. Steadman had been at the University in Vienna with Dr. Klausner, was one of the top British IIF specialists and spoke fluent German. He was then assigned to the British High Commissioner's office in Bonn.

C. It is my opinion that these liaison relationships in the 1950s played an important role for the Doktor, the BRG and the Western Alliance that was coming into existence. I would like to hear the Doktor's views, looking back on these experiences, on this subject.

III NATO and Remilitarization

A. There is one view that the Doktor saw himself as a latter-day von Seeker who was able to provide a life raft for the German General Staff following the defeat of the German Armed Forces in WWII. The Organization was described as a protective environment for the surviving military leaders of WWII German Forces who would, in the Organization, be able to carry on work, research, study and intelligence work that would later be vitally important when Germany's military role in the Western Alliance would be indispensable. There was much evidence to support this viewpoint: Abteilung 35 under Horst von Mellenthin was a highly efficient vehicle for maintaining contact with and exerting some influence on many of the more important surviving officers in West Germany. Also, the Heusinger-Speidel-Foertsch combination eventually

dominated with early phase of remilitarization with Foertsch becoming an early political casualty. The cadres that formed the early structure of the ~~new German Defense Forces~~ new German Defense Forces came primarily from the staffs of the Organization or from among the clientele of Mellenthin's ubiquitous travelling staff.

B. The second view, and the one with which I identify, is that the Doktor never consciously committed himself to the narrow confines of a military role in postwar Europe and would probably not have accepted it if events had moved him in that direction. The role of an intelligence officer appealed to the Doktor because of the extremely broad scope of clandestine or covert work that appeared to be permissible in postwar Europe--as evidenced by the type of operations in which both the larger Western and Soviet-bloc intelligence services were involved in the 25 years after WWII ended. In the immediate postwar period, the Doktor probably exerted a greater influence on political events in Europe than any other German in a quasi-official status in occupied West Germany. We know that for one brief period the Doktor gave some thought to accepting the ~~new~~ BfV job--partly because of the alternatives sponsored by the British and French--Otto Hohm and Wilhelm Friderch Heinz. It appeared to me that the Doktor was committed to the task and not to any specific job or career. At least for many years after WWII, the Doktor appeared to me to be flexible about the means and the job but inflexible about the task and the purpose.

C. There is no doubt that the Organization was a life raft for many of the key military who formed the cadre of the new Germany NATO Army, Air Force and Navy. Politically, psychologically and to some extent technically, ~~the years spent in the Organization bridged the period between WWII and Germany's new role in NATO. At a farewell dinner I gave for General Hausinger before he left Washington to retire from the NATO Standing Group job, General Heusinger gave all of us the fullest praise for having done so much in bridging that period. This is a story that is not in the record. I regard it as one of the most important chapters in this history. But it was my impression that the Doktor ~~saw~~ saw this as only one of many important tasks within the broader framework in which he was committed. I would like to go into this point in some detail to be sure that I understand the Doktor's own recollections and motives.~~

III The Special Problem of the British

A. In more recent years I have gotten the impression that there exists between the Doktor and the key officers of the British Secret Service a great reserve of trust and professional confidence. This was not always so. Indeed, I would have to say that throughout many years of my earlier association with the Doktor, he was preoccupied very often with the problem of the British. I have already alluded to the general skepticism expressed by him in my first meetings with him that the British could be brought into a close association with a "United States of Europe". In military affairs, the German Generals openly supported by the British for dominant roles in the new German Armed Forces were clearly the opposition camp to the group supported by the Doktor. Likewise, the British candidates for key security jobs--Otto John being the most

infamous. But the Doktor's early hostility went far beyond this; there were a number of individuals in Germany whom, he felt, had both British and Soviet connections. On one occasion, I reduced a list of ~~some~~ twenty of these to ~~xxxWxxxxxxWxxxxxx~~ a schematic "who knows whom" and put one of our own analysts to work on it; ~~the~~ the results were inconclusive but the research was not in depth. Seton Delmar was, for example, ~~onxxxxxxWxxxxxx~~ on the suspect list. I do not know what ever happened to this journalist.

B. Unfortunately, thirty years of research and study has not produced satisfactory clarity on many of the IIF cases that go back to WWII. We know now that Kim Philby was sitting in the hierarchy of the British Service in these ~~xxxx~~ years, Felfe was in Pullach and virtually all services had their own versions of a Philby or a Felfe. The Epstein book just out in the USA has loosed a bitter argument about what is real and what is not real in the American CIA.

C. While I do not propose to dig into intelligence cases--this is not the purpose of my current research--I would like to have the Doktor's 1978 footnote to the views he held himself on the British factor in the early years of the Organization. I find it interesting, for example, that Sir Kenneth Strong appears again and again on TV programs as an expert on the Doktor. What is the basis of this? How does the Doktor in 1978 view the role of the British in the Common Market, European Community and NATO?

IV ~~xxx~~ The American Contacts

A. I would like to review the events of the last days of the war. First US contacts. Where? How arranged? Immediate events? Did Doktor meet with Seventh US Army G-2 General Bill Quinn? When did ~~the~~ Doktor arrive in Wiesbaden? Review circumstances of John Boker's arrival on the scene. What roles played by General Sibert, Jack Dean, Eric Waldman?

B. What were experiences in USA? What impression of USA postwar politics? Morgenthau, Truman, Byrnes, Marshall, What conversations in the USA about the future? With whom? Impressions on return to Germany? Communications with Wessel and Baun during 1945-46?

C. Sam Bossard. Impression. Why it failed.

D. Lebel and Phillips. Role ~~of~~ of R. Scow.

V The Bonn Govt.

A. Pre-Sept 1950. The first Adenauer/Schumaker contacts. The Globke role. The "hold in trust" agreement.

B. The non-bloc connections...Egypt, Damascus, Baghdad, S. America etc.

C. Early services to the Adenauer Govt.

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gentle

Perspective

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REINHARD GEHLEN'S POSTWAR ROLE IN PERSPECTIVE

The political polarization of the world was well underway before the American and Russian armies met at the Elbe. James Burnham in his landmark 1947 book, "The Struggle for the World", began that farsighted effort with the sentence: "The Third World War began in April 1944." He was describing a mutiny of communist Greek sailors in a ship under British protection in the port of Alexandria.

Satisfying my curiosity as to how early Reinhard Gehlen made his own estimate on the postwar world was high on my personal agenda in my early years in Pullach. I concluded within a year or two that as early as 1942 he foresaw that the forces of history already on the move probably would produce a bipolar world with the United States and the Soviet Union contending for influence. This idea had obviously gained strength in his mind by the time he met the Americans in May 1945.

By the time I met him in 1948, Reinhard Gehlen was a man who knew, in political terms, exactly what he believed in and what he wanted to do to accomplish his political goals. And in the eight years that followed, with amazing persistence, Gehlen achieved what he set out to do: To build a German intelligence service that could be integrated in an emerging postwar German government that would find its place in a Western alliance headed by the United States in which a united Western Europe would have a central importance. In this conviction, there were no doubts and no vacillation.

The almost immediate emergence at the end of WW II of political conflicts between the USSR and the Western alliance, accompanied almost from the first by the perception of the West that armed conflict could not be ruled out, created an immediate need for intelligence on the intentions and capabilities of the Soviets. Germany had just completed three years of armed conflict with Soviet forces preceded by several decades in which intelligence on Russia had been high on Germany's national agenda. Gehlen's negotiating position was apparent. In terms of skilled and experienced human resources with an organized body of data on the Soviet armed forces, Gehlen's group obviously had a great deal to offer the West.

The senior US military intelligence official in Europe in 1946 made essentially a pragmatic decision to exploit these assets and the knowledge of the Soviets that Gehlen brought from his principal wartime role as chief of Fremde Herre Ost. The decision of General Sibert was consciously not a political matter. There is no record that the first steps with the Gehlen organization were presented to the US government as politically significant. But for Gehlen, the agreement with the US had to be seen in

political terms -- the opening of a long-term relationship with the West.

Gehlen provided the surviving cadre of the German General Staff a lifeboat in a tumultuous geopolitical sea left by a war that went all the way to "unconditional surrender." The United States government certainly was not consciously motivated in the immediate aftermath of the war by an interest in saving a cadre of experienced German officers around whom a future German intelligence service and armed forces could be built. But by 1948 it was quite evident that the survivors of the German General Staff were well represented in the Gehlen group. Fortunately for both Gehlen and his American sponsors, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg had rejected the effort of the prosecutor to indict and convict the General Staff. Not surprisingly, General I.T. Nikitchenko, the Soviet member of the International Military Tribunal, had filed a dissenting view.

By early 1949 it was apparent to any serious observer of world events that a new military alliance was emerging in the West, that the defense of Europe would be a commitment of such an alliance and that the part of Germany that was not occupied by the Soviet forces would eventually become a recognized nation state, would join and be welcomed into a Western alliance.

Gehlen provided a haven in the early years for a number of former officers of the German armed forces who were clearly destined to return to conventional military careers. Several of the Americans that worked with the Gehlen organization developed the theory that Gehlen saw himself as a latter-day von Seeckt aspiring to use the interim association with the Americans and the Western Europeans as a springboard to lead the rebuilding of a German General Staff which he would head.

I never shared this view -- partly because of my perception that building an intelligence service was his genuine goal and partly because of my conclusion by early in 1949 that Adolf Heusinger, then the head of Gehlen's staff preparing intelligence studies and estimates, had the credentials to play the principal role in Germany's initial remilitarization and finding its place militarily in the Western alliance. But more important, Gehlen also seemed to assume that Heusinger's future lay in resumption of his military career.

When the German armed forces were formed, many in the initial cadres came out of the Gehlen organization or from among the hundreds of former German officers who identified in some way with the political and psychological rationale developed by Gehlen and his senior associates. Because professional contacts with the US and Western European military staffs gradually became routine for Gehlen's senior staff in Pullach, the later transition for these former officers back into uniform within the German niche in the emerging NATO alliance came easily.

Efforts by interested observers to assess the ultimate significance of the Gehlen organization in the rebuilding of Germany and its eventual integration into Western Europe and the NATO alliance often focus on two issues: (1) the extent to which the Soviets succeeded in penetrating the organization; and (2) the extent to which unacceptably tainted figures out of the intelligence, security and military organization affiliated with the NSDAP had been utilized by Gehlen.

Because the leadership of the Gehlen organization lacked any legal status in Germany and thus no official means for motivating or controlling employees, Gehlen faced serious limitations in carrying out security investigations of his subordinates. Given the realities of a divided Germany with one part under Soviet control, a massive and sometime successful Soviet effort to penetrate the organization was, from the first, assumed. In the early postwar years, West Germany was quite accurately described as an "intelligence jungle." By the early 1950s, something over 90% of the Soviet-controlled espionage cases brought to trial in the non-communist world, occurred in West Germany. It would have been remarkable if there had not been a Felde case. All of the Western governments, without the vulnerabilities of being half of a recently divided nation, bitterly experienced KGB and GRU penetrations into vitally sensitive offices.


Gehlen's heavy reliance on long-standing professional, personal and family connections within military circles, particularly the German General Staff, reflected his confidence in the probable security and loyalty of these familiar groups. In his heavy reliance on the German military, Gehlen initially paid the price of a staff with limited experience in operational intelligence tradecraft that is claimed as professionally essential by all of the Western services as well as those of the communist countries. Basically, the NSDAP had taken over and politicized all of the operating police, security and intelligence organizations of Nazi Germany some years before the final defeat in 1945. There is no doubt that some of the operating elements only loosely controlled and physically remote from Gehlen and his staff were constantly tempted to draw on the professional experience of available but politically unacceptable operators. This was particularly true in the chaotic circumstances that existed in Germany during at least the first five years after the end of the war. But by the beginning of the 1950s when legalization of the organization as the German service became Gehlen's preoccupation, he had too much at stake politically in Bonn and with the Western intelligence services to assume the political risk of harboring politically tainted intelligence and security specialists from the Third Reich.

Although Gehlen espoused the "ueberparteilich" code of the General Staff, there is no doubt that his political inclinations in the early postwar years moved along the same lines as those of the Adenauer and the Christian Socialist movement in Western Europe. And from the first he actively supported the earliest

efforts of the French leaders dedicated to the idea of a united Western Europe. Gehlen's political balance within Germany was evident in the fact that his first meeting with Chancellor Conrad Adenauer was followed by just twenty four hours with his first meeting with Kurt Schumacher, the strong leaders of the opposition Socialist Party. The integration of the Gehlen organization into the Bonn government as the BND on 1 April 1956 appeared to have broad political support.

In a sense, the great significance of Gehlen's accomplishment was political and must be judged in context of the evolution of the Western alliance that has kept Europe at peace for almost 45 years. It would be too much to say that it didn't matter politically that an occasional SD member turned up in the Gehlen organization or to argue that a high level spy of Felfe's character did not endanger hundreds of Gehlen sources in communist territory and constitute a great embarrassment for Gehlen as head of the service. The costliness of hostile penetrations ultimately directed by the KGB has been well documented in the hundreds of "damage assessments" that have followed the exposure of Soviet penetrations of Western governments. But ultimately, history must assess what Reinhard Gehlen did in the context of Germany's postwar political transition from an enemy to an ally of the Western alliance.

Finally, a word about Gehlen's personal goal. My last conversation with Reinhard Gehlen was in the simple circumstances of his home at Berg on Strarnberger See. He was obviously on his death bed, weak, drawn and barely able to communicate. Herta Gehlen sat in a chair at the foot of his bed. His last words to me, uttered with a visible effort, was an expression of appreciation for what I had done to help him achieve "den Traum meines Lebens -- Der Dienst."


J. Critchfield 22 September 1988

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

als Minister und drohte: „Landesausschuß und Landesvorstandsschaft (der CSU) wollen sich heute mit Ihren Bemerkungen über Herrn Minister Strauß... befassen.“

Statt mit einem Kabel antwortete Rollmann „nach Rückkehr von einer kleinen Reise“ am vergangenen Montag mit einem Brief. Er fand es unglaublich, daß Strauß sich das Recht beilege, von „einem Nicht-Mitglied Ihrer Partei in einer derartigen Form Aufklärung über Äußerungen (zu) verlangen“.

Der Abgeordnete beschwor vergangene bessere Zeiten: „Ich habe Ihr Verhalten vor dem Bundestag in der ‚Spiegel‘-Affäre gegen jedermann damit verteidigt, daß Sie offensichtlich aufgrund der jahrelang gegen Sie gerichteten Angriffe gesundheitlich am Ende gewesen seien. Ich hatte gehofft, daß Ihr Urlaub Sie so wieder herstellen würde, daß Sie für unser Land und unsere Partei wieder von Nutzen sein könnten.“

Der Urlaub hat aber offenbar seinen Zweck verfehlt. Zahlreiche Strauß-Äußerungen aus der jüngsten Zeit — so fuhr Rollmann fort — hätten ihn „so bedenklich gestimmt, daß ich nunmehr wirklich der Auffassung bin, daß Sie fürs erste nicht wieder Mitglied der Bundesregierung werden können“.

SPIONAGE

FELFE

Umarmt und geküßt

Der Angeklagte Heinz Paul Johann Felfe kniff die dünnen Lippen zusammen. Leise, aber metallisch fielen die Worte: „Ich wollte in den Augen der Sowjets dastehen wie eine Eins.“

Zehn Jahre lang stand Felfe als Sowjet-Eins im Zentrum des Bundesnachrichtendienstes (BND) und plünderte ihn für Moskau. Dann stand er vor dem Bundesgerichtshof — ein kalter Intelligenzler, dessen präzise arbeitende Gehirn-Maschine alles herschnurte, was der Dritte Strafsenat wissen wollte.

Wo sich die Richter irrten, korrigierte sie der Angeklagte mit erhobenem Finger. Wo Felfes Gedächtnis vor Gericht Lücken aufwies, halfen jene kleinen Notizhefte nach, in denen der Spion die Details seines Verrats festgehalten hatte: die Daten der Treffs mit sowjetischen Sicherheitsoffizieren, die Höhe der empfangenen Honorare — insgesamt etwa 150 000 Mark —, den Inhalt des abgelieferten Materials.

Bundesrichter Weber, Vorsitzender des Dritten Strafsenats: „Diese Eintragungen zeichnen sich durch große Genauigkeit und Vollständigkeit aus.“

Sie machten das Ausmaß des Landesverrats deutlich, den Felfe in Gemeinschaft mit seinen ebenfalls angeklagten Komplizen Hans Clemens und Erwin Tiebel in der Münchner BND-Zentrale geübt hat: Das Trio verbrachte 300 Minox-Filme mit insgesamt 15 000 Aufnahmen geheimer Dokumente und 20 Tonbänder nach dem Osten, sowie zahlreiche wörtlich oder per Funk übermittelte Botschaften. Die roten Spione flogen in Kuriermaschinen der US-Luftwaffe zu ihren Treffs nach Berlin oder warfen an verabredeten Stellen auf der Berlin-Autobahn Konservendosen mit Mikrofilmen aus ihren Limousinen.

Da alle drei Angeklagten sich als alte Kameraden aus dem Reichssicherheitshauptamt der SS vorstellten, da Clemens in Karlsruhe behauptete, er sei vom BND ausdrücklich beauftragt gewesen, berufslose frühere SD-Leute aufzusammeln, und da Sowjet-Eins Felfe auf diesem Weg wirklich angeheuert worden war, schien es einige Tage lang, als sei Bonns Abwehr ein von roten Spionen eng durchsetztes Refugium der SS. Dann schwächte Gehlens Dienstherr, Staatssekretär Globke, ab: Nicht einmal ein Prozent des BND-Personals entstamme der SS oder dem SD.

Bei einer (in der britischen „Sunday Times“ genannten) Effektivstärke von etwa 2200 hauptamtlichen BND-Männern würden mithin nur rund zwanzig frühere Schwarzköpfe dem Bundesnachrichtendienst angehören.


Das wiederum ist eine Zahl, die zu niedrig liegt. Denn als der heutige BND-Chef, Generalleutnant a. D. Reinhard Gehlen, 61, als Chef der Abteilung

betrieben Rekrutierungsprinzipien im Deutschland der Nachkriegszeit keineswegs ungewöhnlich.

Im westdeutschen Kriminaldienst und in den Verfassungsschutzämtern, denen im Gegensatz zum BND die interne Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik anvertraut ist, schlüpfen nach dem Krieg viele frühere SD-Größen unter, die bislang nur zum Teil identifiziert werden konnten.

So gelang es zwar, den rheinland-pfälzischen Kripo-Chef Heuser als Mörder von 30 000 Juden zu entlarven und ebenso den SD-Führer Krumbach, der von der Ulmer Staatsanwaltschaft jahrelang gesucht wurde, während er als Haupt-V-Mann des nordrhein-westfälischen Verfassungsschutzes in Dortmund amtierte.

Kriminalrat Theo Saevecke schließlich, Landesverratsexperte in der Bonner Sicherungsgruppe des Bundeskriminalamtes und alter Felfe-Freund,



Geheimdienst-Chef Gehlen (vorn M.), Gehilfe Wessel (hinten l.) 1944: Alte Kameraden

„Fremde Heere Ost“ im Oberkommando des Heeres 1944 zuletzt photographiert, nach der Kapitulation von der US-Regierung beauftragt wurde, seine Geheimaufklärung gen Osten weiterzuführen, rekrutierte er seine Mitarbeiter mit ausdrücklicher Billigung der Amerikaner vornehmlich aus ehemaligen Angehörigen der zerschlagenen Spionageapparate des Dritten Reiches*.

Diese Männer waren die einzigen Deutschen, die sich damals auf dieses Handwerk verstanden. Außerdem hofften der amerikanische Geheimdienst und General Gehlen, durch ehemalige NS-Agenten genau das zu erreichen, was den Sowjets umgekehrt mit Felfe, Clemens und Tiebel gelang: Die Kameraderie unter den Spionageexperten des Dritten Reiches auszunutzen, um in den gegnerischen Herrschaftsbereich und, wenn möglich, in den gegnerischen Geheimdienst einzudringen.

General Gehlen, dessen Organisation erst 1955 von der Bundesregierung übernommen wurde, hatte damit Erfolg: Sein Nachrichtendienst ist bis heute der erfolgreichste Spionageapparat der Nato gegen den Osten.

Darüber hinaus waren die von Gehlen unter Einkalkulierung des Risikos

entpuppte sich nach der SPIEGEL-Affäre als SS-Hauptsturmführer.

Welche Persönlichkeiten hingegen im Kölner Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz die westdeutsche Demokratie bewachen, blieb bislang unbekannt, obwohl schon auch etliche von ihnen an ihrer Vergangenheit zu tragen haben.

So war ein — heute vorwiegend mit Sicherheitsfragen des eigenen Hauses befaßter — höherer Beamter vormals SS-Sturmbannführer, SD-Mann und Lehrer an der Reichskriminalpolizeischule**.

So war der Gruppenleiter einer Abteilung SD-Mann in der Pariser Deutschen Botschaft und bei Kriegsende gleichfalls SS-Sturmbannführer, ein Rang, den Felfe vergeblich erstrebte.

In derselben Abteilung stammen außer dem Abteilungschef und zwei

* Hitlers Generalstabschef Guderian über die Tätigkeit des Geheimdienstgenerals: „Die Voraussagen Gehlens haben sich bewährt. Das ist eine geschichtliche Tatsache.“

** Rangmäßig entsprach etwa der Stabstabsführer dem Oberst, der Sturmbannführer dem Major, der Hauptsturmführer dem Hauptmann und der Obersturmführer dem Oberleutnant.

Referatsleitern sämtliche Chargen aus Abwehr- oder Sicherheitsdiensten. Es wirkten

- ▷ ein Referatsleiter als Direktor bei der Geheimen Feldpolizei,
- ▷ ein weiterer Referatsleiter als Gestapo-Kommissar und SS-Hauptsturmführer,
- ▷ ein Sachbearbeiter, der bis 1957 gegenüber den Alliierten unter falschem Namen geführt wurde, als Gestapo-Kommissar und SS-Hauptsturmführer,
- ▷ ein weiterer Sachbearbeiter, der bis 1954 unter falschem Namen geführt wurde, bei der Gestapo.

Es war daher paradox, daß SPD-Volksvertreter Ritzel aus Anlaß des Felfe-Prozesses in Bonn fragte: „Wir haben einen Verfassungsschutz — wo blieb er, als es galt, den Herren vom Bundesnachrichtendienst auf die Finger zu sehen?“

Selbst wenn die Kölner die Kompetenz gehabt hätten, die Münchner zu überwachen — was nicht der Fall ist; jeder Geheimdienst hat seine eigene Abschirm-Abteilung —, wären sie schwerlich dafür geeignet gewesen.

Das Risiko, neben unbelasteten Abwehroffizieren des Heeres auch ehemalige SD-Leute aus Reinhard Heydrichs Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) ins Haus zu nehmen, bestand für alle Dienste. Diese Leute waren dazu prädestiniert, vom gegnerischen Apparat umgedreht zu werden: Ihre — verschwiegene — NS-Vergangenheit mußte Erpresser aus dem Osten anlocken.

Felfe und Genossen freilich, nicht erpreßt, sondern generös entlohnt, gaben andere Motive vor. „Ich hasse die Amerikaner wie die Pest“, gestand Clemens vor Gericht. Nach dem US-Luftangriff auf Dresden, 1945, habe er geschworen: „Ich werde es ihnen doppelt und dreifach heimzahlen.“

Felfe brüstete sich noch vor Gericht, einst zu Deutschlands Elite gehört zu haben. Mit 13 Jahren trat er dem NS-Schülerbund bei: „Ich war für mein Alter außerordentlich kräftig entwickelt.“

Als der Jung-Nazist vier Jahre später in die profane SA überwiesen werden sollte, weigerte er sich und zog die SS vor, wollte aber auch kein gewöhnlicher Totenköpfler sein: „Ich suchte mir die vornehmste Einheit aus, die Kraftfahrgruppe.“

Der ehrgeizige SS-Mann erhielt ein Stipendium des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes, mußte jedoch sein Berufsziel, die höhere Kriminallaufbahn, wegen des Krieges aufgeben. Der Dresdner Clemens holte den Dresdner Felfe in die Praxis des Amtes, dessen Stipendiat er gewesen war. Der 25jährige übernahm in der Abteilung VI (Auslands-Nachrichtendienst) das Referat „Schweiz“ und wurde SS-Obersturmführer.

Freund Clemens, zuletzt SS-Hauptsturmführer und Kriminalrat, hatte an sich Militär-Musikus gelernt, aber frühzeitig auf SS umgesattelt, nachdem er als ziviler Pianist gescheitert war. 1931 in Partei und SS eingetreten, sorgte er nach seinen Worten „wie jeder andere bei Saalschlachten für Ordnung“ und kämpfte gegen die Kommune, „wie sich's gehörte“.

Bundesrichter Weber im Prozeß: „Sie sollen als Schläger bekannt gewesen sein.“ Clemens: „Ich war niemals fei-



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Doppel-Spion Clemens
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Im Sommer 1950 stellte das Ministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen den einstigen SS-Obersturmführer Felfe als Befragter von ehemaligen Volkspolizisten in westdeutschen Flüchtlingslagern an. Nun tat sich für Clemens eine neue Nachrichtenquelle auf. Im Herbst jenes Jahres verfaßte Felfe im Auftrag des Ministeriums ein „Gelbbuch“ über die Ergebnisse der Vopo-Befragungen. Ein Exemplar davon wanderte über die Eheleute Clemens an „Max“.

Dann gelang es Clemens per Zufall, an die Krippe vorzudringen: Im D-Zug zwischen Bonn und Düsseldorf traf er einen alten Bekannten vom SD, der ihm die Adresse eines weiteren alten Bekannten, des SS-Standartenführers Krichbaum in Reichenhall, nannte.

Dieser Krichbaum, früher Verbindungsmann zwischen Admiral Canaris und dem RSHA, war „Bezirksvertreter“ des BND für Bayern geworden. Clemens reiste schnurstracks nach Reichenhall, um mit Krichbaum Wiedersehen zu feiern. Krichbaum: „Was machst du?“ Clemens: „Schrotthandel.“ Krichbaum: „Ich habe was für dich.“

Bald sah Hans Clemens seinen alten Freund Krichbaum öfter. Am 15. Juni 1951 trat er seinen Dienst bei der Gehlen-Organisation an: „Ich hatte Auftrag, ehemalige SD-Leute zu melden, die keinen Beruf mehr hätten, die könnten wieder tätig werden.“

Als Krichbaum fünf Monate später auch den inzwischen aus dem Dienst des Kaiser-Ministeriums geschiedenen SD-Kollegen Heinz Felfe, von Clemens empfohlen, für die Organisation Gehlen anheuerte, war Felfe schon, von Clemens empfohlen, je einmal in Karlsruhe und in Dresden bei „Max“ zu Besuch gewesen. „Alles geklappt“, schrieben die beiden am Abend des 26. Oktober 1951 per Postkarte an „Max“, als sie im Münchner „Königshof“ auf ihre Zukunft tranken.

Acht Jahre später, als Chruschtschow den früheren US-Geheimdienst-Chef Allen Dulles im Weißen Haus augenzwinkernd aufforderte: „Es ist wohl an der Zeit, daß wir aufhören, unseren jeweiligen Spionen zwei Gehälter zu zahlen“, kassierten die drei von beiden Seiten erkleckliche Summen: Felfe, bis

zu seiner Verhaftung Regierungsrat auf Probe, wurde bei Gehlen aber mit monatlich 1700 Mark netto eingestuft. Von seinen 150 000 Mark erwarb sich der hausväterlich rechnende Doppelspion ein Haus am Starnberger See.

Freund Clemens hingegen verbubelte etwa 140 000 Mark, die er für seine Dienste erhielt. Clemens: „Ich habe gut gelebt, die Welt gesehen.“ Oberst „Max“ wußte den Gourmet bei Laune zu halten, indem er ihm bei jedem Treff einige Dosen Hummer zusteckte. Clemens: „Hummer eß ich für mein Leben gern.“

Während Clemens die Früchte seines Verrats noch genießen konnte, rackerte sich Felfe im Hause Gehlen nach oben. Er wurde Leiter des Sowjet-Referats der Abteilung III f (Gegenspionage). Bundesrichter Weber: „Der richtige Mann am richtigen Ort.“

Die Ostkontakte ließen sich nunmehr noch unauffälliger pflegen, die Ausbeute, teilweise in einem doppelbödigen Koffer über die Grenze gebracht, wurde fetter. Felfe verriet vor allem die streng geheimen Wochenberichte des BND, die Monatsberichte der Spionage-Abwehr und die Lageberichte des Verfassungsschutzes.

Da die Sowjets in Felfes Abteilung „Überfluß an Agenten“ hatten, ließen sie ihren Spion dies wissen und forderten ihn auf, sich in eine andere Abteilung versetzen zu lassen.

Felfe und Clemens hingegen waren keineswegs gewillt, allen Befehlen spornstreichs zu gehorchen. Clemens: „Wenn schönes Wetter war, dachte ich, die sollen mich in Ruhe lassen.“

Die Sowjets fütterten ihre Spione mit durchaus echtem, teilweise sogar wertvollem Geheimmaterial, das Felfes Autorität im Amt Gehlen wohl bekam. Niemand witterte Verrat, so daß Felfe und Clemens 1960 ihr zehnjähriges Berufsjubiläum beim deutschen und sowjetischen Geheimdienst feiern konnten.

In Ostberlin wurde ihnen eine Gratifikation von 2000 West-Mark samt einer Belobigungsurkunde des Moskauer Geheimdienst-Chefs Schelepin überreicht. Gehlen, dessen Etat mit vielen — für 1963 mit 58 — Millionen Mark ausgewiesen ist, begnügte sich mit einer Plakette, auf der Ritter Georg den Drachen speißt. Umschrift: „Für treue Dienste“.

Dem General Gehlen blieb der Experten-Trost, daß sein BND die drei Kameraden ein Jahr später selbst entlarven konnte und daß Felfe auch die Gefängnisbehörden und den Untersuchungsrichter des Bundesgerichtshofes überrückelte, indem er noch in der Untersuchungshaft mit seinen Moskauer Auftraggebern korrespondierte (SPIEGEL 23/1963).

Da BND-Chef Gehlen als Ministerialdirektor politischer Beamter ist, könnte er theoretisch jederzeit pensioniert werden. Im gerüchtfreudigen Bonn wurde daher aus Anlaß des Felfe-Prozesses auch bereits der Brigadegeneral Wessel, der im Krieg in Gehlens Abteilung „Fremde Heere Ost“ und nach dem Krieg zeitweilig als Chef von Straußens „Militärischem Abschirmdienst“ (MAD) wirkte, als potentieller Nachfolger Gehlens genannt. Doch der deutsche Geheimchef selbst denkt nicht daran, sich etwa aus Gesundheitsrücksichten vorzeitig zur Ruhe zu setzen.

Der Mann, der die wirkungsvollste Ostaufklärung der westlichen Welt kommandiert, fühlt sich kerngesund.

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
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FESTIVALES de ESPAÑA 1963

AUGUST

Santander	(1.—30.)
Cádiz	(2.—15.)
Tarragona	(3.—31.)
Pontevedra	(4.—14.)
Huesca	(9.—15.)
Algeciras	(11.—18.)
Ronda	(11.—18.)
Motril	(11.—18.)
Elche	(16.—23.)
Bilbao	(23.—31.)
Priego de Córdoba	(25.—31.)

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DEUTSCHLAND

ge.“ Weber: „Wenn man so die Akten liest, hat man wirklich nicht den Eindruck.“

Nebenberuflich verwaltete Clemens schon vor dem Krieg die SD-Außenstelle Dresden. Über seinen Schreibtisch liefen jene Berichte, die der Rechtsanwalt Tiebel, Parteimitglied seit 1933 und NSDAP-Kreisrichter, als freier Mitarbeiter des SD anfertigte. Gemeinsam bekehrte man am Stammtisch im „Englischen Garten“.

Als Clemens in die Berliner Zentrale des RSHA aufrückte, zog er Tiebel nach, der es aber nur bis zum SS-Oberscharführer brachte. Felfe war tüchtiger als der ängstliche Bürger Tiebel und zielstrebig als der Lebemann Clemens. Beide waren ihm zeitweilig unterstellt.

Aber Rangunterschiede trennten sie nicht. Tiebel: „Als der Ältere habe ich Felfe damals das Du angeboten.“

Nach dem Krieg hatte sich Tiebel zum Bauunternehmer umgeschult und lebte im sauerländischen Lendingsen. Jedoch, die Vergangenheit holte ihn ein. Tiebel: „Eines schönen Tages piff jemand — da stand Felfe da.“

Der einstige Schweiz-Referent hatte Tiebels neuen Wohnsitz über dessen Dresdener Verwandtschaft aufgetan, war nach Westen marschiert und bei seiner Schwester in Rhöndorf am Rhein untergekommen, wenige Schritte von Konrad Adenauers Eigenheim.

Die britische Militärregierung nahm seine Dienste an und regelte seine Entnazifizierung: Felfe kam als Nichtbetroffener in Gruppe V. Bundesrichter Weber: „Donnerwetter!“

Im Sauerland wiedervereint, organisierten die beiden SD-Kameraden zunächst einmal eine Art seelischen Notdienst für ihren dritten Kumpel: für Clemens, den Stammtischfreund aus dem „Englischen Garten“ in Dresden.

Kamerad Clemens litt Not. In Rom sah er einem Prozeß wegen der Exekution von 335 italienischen Geiseln entgegen, an der auch er — unter dem damaligen römischen Sicherheitspolizeichef Kappler — teilgenommen hatte.

Qualifizierte Tiebel seinen Clemens vor Gericht: „Er war mehr für exekutive Arbeit geeignet.“

Felfe und Tiebel blieben ständig in Kontakt mit dem Häftling Clemens. Wenn Felfe aus Rom Post erhielt, schickte er sie Tiebel, und wenn — umgekehrt — in Lendingsen Nachrichten aus Rom eintrafen, liefen sie auch nach Rhöndorf. Tiebel: „Wir hatten uns gesagt: Man muß ihm Halt geben, damit er nicht zusammensackt.“ Clemens wurde zu aller Überraschung freigesprochen. Tiebel: „Wenn du zurückkommst — du kannst bei mir wohnen.“

Es dauerte freilich über ein Jahr, bis die Italiener Clemens endgültig freiließen. Am 25. September 1949, zehn Tage nachdem Konrad Adenauer in Bonn zum Bundeskanzler gewählt worden war, zog in Rhöndorf eine beschwingte Gesellschaft an des Kanzlers Haus vorbei: Der frisch in die Freiheit entlassene SS-Mann Clemens war auf der Reise nach Lendingsen in Rhöndorf ausgestiegen, hatte sich in einer Gaststätte eine Gruppe von Bänkelsängern engagiert und zog nun mit Musik den Ort hinauf, den ahnungslosen Felfe zu überraschen.

Nachdem die beiden ausgiebig wieder zusammen gefeiert hatten, setzte sich

Clemens nach Lendingsen in Marsch und nahm bei Tiebel Quartier.

Ein Beruf für den berufslosen Heimkehrer fand sich auch bald. Ende Januar 1950 kam Frau Clemens aus Dresden herüber, deren vergebliche Versuche, sich dem Charme russischer Offiziere zu entziehen, dem Ehemann nicht unbekannt geblieben waren.

Die Begegnung verlief daher auch gänzlich unsentimental. Man vereinbarte lediglich, daß Clemens demnächst einmal nach Dresden kommen solle, wo Offiziere des sowjetischen Nachrichtendienstes ihn schon erwarteten.

Mit den besten Wünschen seiner Kameraden reiste Clemens noch im selben Frühjahr in die Sowjetzone. Bei Nacht und Nebel heuerte ihn der Sowjet-Oberst „Max“ in einer Waldschlucht gegen ein erstes Handgeld von 1000 Mark für den gleichen Auftrag an, den Clemens später vom Amt Gehlen erhielt: Er sollte alte Kameraden gewinnen. Oberst „Max“: „Du hast ein Jahr Anlaufzeit.“

Die russischen Vertragspartner waren von Clemens beeindruckt. Lebemann Clemens: „Sie haben mich umarmt und geküßt.“ Dagegen Felfe: „Ich wurde selbstverständlich nicht geküßt.“

Wieder im Westen, berichtete Clemens den Kumpanen Felfe und Tiebel von seinem Abenteuer, was Felfe, der inzwischen in Bonn als freier Journalist firmierte, zum Anlaß nahm, sogleich seine eingeschlafenen Beziehungen zum Nachrichtendienst der britischen Militärregierung wieder zu aktivieren: Er offerierte den Briten die Clemens-Verbindungen in den Osten als neu zu erschließende Nachrichtenquelle. Aber die Engländer bissen nicht an.

Immerhin konnte Felfe dem Protestanten Clemens ein Zimmer im Bonner katholischen Jungmännerheim beschaffen, von wo der Dresden-Fahrer auschwärmte, um „alte Bekanntschaften wieder aufzufrischen“. Der SS-Mann Felfe teilte dem SS-Mann Clemens mit, wo man im Bundeshaus an Pressemitteilungen, Waschzettel und sonstiges Druckzeug kam. Frau Clemens transportierte die Sachen von Zeit zu Zeit von Bonn nach Dresden. Das Geschäft steckte noch in den Anfängen.



Doppel-Spion Felfe

„In den Augen der Sowjets...

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

REINHARD GEHLEN'S POSTWAR ROLE IN PERSPECTIVE

The political polarization of the world was well underway before the American and Russian armies met at the Elbe. James Burnham in his landmark 1947 book, "The Struggle for the World", began that farsighted effort with the sentence: "The Third World War began in April 1944." He was describing a mutiny of communist Greek sailors in a ship under British protection in the port of Alexandria.

Satisfying my curiosity as to how early Reinhard Gehlen made his own estimate on the postwar world was high on my personal agenda in my early years in Pullach. I concluded within a year or two that as early as 1942 he foresaw that the forces of history already on the move probably would produce a bipolar world with the United States and the Soviet Union contending for influence. This idea had obviously gained strength in his mind by the time he met the Americans in May 1945.

By the time I met him in 1948, Reinhard Gehlen was a man who knew, in political terms, exactly what he believed in and what he wanted to do to accomplish his political goals. And in the eight years that followed, with amazing persistence, Gehlen achieved what he set out to do: To build a German intelligence service that could be integrated in an emerging postwar German government that would find its place in a Western alliance headed by the United States in which a united Western Europe would have a central importance. In this conviction, there were no doubts and no vacillation.

The almost immediate emergence at the end of WW II of political conflicts between the USSR and the Western alliance, accompanied almost from the first by the perception of the West that armed conflict could not be ruled out, created an immediate need for intelligence on the intentions and capabilities of the Soviets. Germany had just completed three years of armed conflict with Soviet forces preceded by several decades in which intelligence on Russia had been high on Germany's national agenda. Gehlen's negotiating position was apparent. In terms of skilled and experienced human resources with an organized body of data on the Soviet armed forces, Gehlen's group obviously had a great deal to offer the West.

The senior US military intelligence official in Europe in 1946 made essentially a pragmatic decision to exploit these assets and the knowledge of the Soviets that Gehlen brought from his principal wartime role as chief of Fremde Herre Ost. The decision of General Sibert was consciously not a political matter. There is no record that the first steps with the Gehlen organization were presented to the US government as politically significant. But for Gehlen, the agreement with the US had to be seen in

political terms -- the opening of a long-term relationship with the West.

Gehlen provided the surviving cadre of the German General Staff a lifeboat in a tumultuous geopolitical sea left by a war that went all the way to "unconditional surrender." The United States government certainly was not consciously motivated in the immediate aftermath of the war by an interest in saving a cadre of experienced German officers around whom a future German intelligence service and armed forces could be built. But by 1948 it was quite evident that the survivors of the German General Staff were well represented in the Gehlen group. Fortunately for both Gehlen and his American sponsors, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg had rejected the effort of the prosecutor to indict and convict the General Staff. Not surprisingly, General I.T. Nikitchenko, the Soviet member of the International Military Tribunal, had filed a dissenting view.

By early 1949 it was apparent to any serious observer of world events that a new military alliance was emerging in the West, that the defense of Europe would be a commitment of such an alliance and that the part of Germany that was not occupied by the Soviet forces would eventually become a recognized nation state, would join and be welcomed into a Western alliance.

Gehlen provided a haven in the early years for a number of former officers of the German armed forces who were clearly destined to return to conventional military careers. Several of the Americans that worked with the Gehlen organization developed the theory that Gehlen saw himself as a latter-day von Seeckt aspiring to use the interim association with the Americans and the Western Europeans as a springboard to lead the rebuilding of a German General Staff which he would head.

I never shared this view -- partly because of my perception that building an intelligence service was his genuine goal and partly because of my conclusion by early in 1949 that Adolf Heusinger, then the head of Gehlen's staff preparing intelligence studies and estimates, had the credentials to play the principal role in Germany's initial remilitarization and finding its place militarily in the Western alliance. But more important, Gehlen also seemed to assume that Heusinger's future lay in resumption of his military career.

When the German armed forces were formed, many in the initial cadres came out of the Gehlen organization or from among the hundreds of former German officers who identified in some way with the political and psychological rationale developed by Gehlen and his senior associates. Because professional contacts with the US and Western European military staffs gradually became routine for Gehlen's senior staff in Pullach, the later transition for these former officers back into uniform within the German niche in the emerging NATO alliance came easily.

Efforts by interested observers to assess the ultimate significance of the Gehlen organization in the rebuilding of Germany and its eventual integration into Western Europe and the NATO alliance often focus on two issues: (1) the extent to which the Soviets succeeded in penetrating the organization; and (2) the extent to which unacceptably tainted figures out of the intelligence, security and military organization affiliated with the NSDAP had been utilized by Gehlen.

Because the leadership of the Gehlen organization lacked any legal status in Germany and thus no official means for motivating or controlling employees, Gehlen faced serious limitations in carrying out security investigations of his subordinates. Given the realities of a divided Germany with one part under Soviet control, a massive and sometime successful Soviet effort to penetrate the organization was, from the first, assumed. In the early postwar years, West Germany was quite accurately described as an "intelligence jungle." By the early 1950s, something over 90% of the Soviet-controlled espionage cases brought to trial in the non-communist world, occurred in West Germany. It would have been remarkable if there had not been a Felde case. All of the Western governments, without the vulnerabilities of being half of a recently divided nation, bitterly experienced KGB and GRU penetrations into vitally sensitive offices.


Gehlen's heavy reliance on long-standing professional, personal and family connections within military circles, particularly the German General Staff, reflected his confidence in the probable security and loyalty of these familiar groups. In his heavy reliance on the Germany military, Gehlen initially paid the price of a staff with limited experience in operational intelligence tradecraft that is claimed as professionally essential by all of the Western services as well as those of the communist countries. Basically, the NSDAP had taken over and politicized all of the operating police, security and intelligence organizations of Nazi Germany some years before the final defeat in 1945. There is no doubt that some of the operating elements only loosely controlled and physically remote from Gehlen and his staff were constantly tempted to draw on the professional experience of available but politically unacceptable operators. This was particularly true in the chaotic circumstances that existed in Germany during at least the first five years after the end of the war. But by the beginning of the 1950s when legalization of the organization as the German service became Gehlen's preoccupation, he had too much at stake politically in Bonn and with the Western intelligence services to assume the political risk of harboring politically tainted intelligence and security specialists from the Third Reich.

Although Gehlen espoused the "ueberparteilich" code of the General Staff, there is no doubt that his political inclinations in the early postwar years moved along the same lines as those of the Adenauer and the Christian Socialist movement in Western Europe. And from the first he actively supported the earliest

efforts of the French leaders dedicated to the idea of a united Western Europe. Gehlen's political balance within Germany was evident in the fact that his first meeting with Chancellor Conrad Adenauer was followed by just twenty four hours with his first meeting with Kurt Schumacher, the strong leaders of the opposition Socialist Party. The integration of the Gehlen organization into the Bonn government as the BND on 1 April 1956 appeared to have broad political support.

In a sense, the great significance of Gehlen's accomplishment was political and must be judged in context of the evolution of the Western alliance that has kept Europe at peace for almost 45 years. It would be too much to say that it didn't matter politically that an occasional SD member turned up in the Gehlen organization or to argue that a high level spy of Felfe's character did not endanger hundreds of Gehlen sources in communist territory and constitute a great embarrassment for Gehlen as head of the service. The costliness of hostile penetrations ultimately directed by the KGB has been well documented in the hundreds of "damage assessments" that have followed the exposure of Soviet penetrations of Western governments. But ultimately, history must assess what Reinhard Gehlen did in the context of Germany's postwar political transition from an enemy to an ally of the Western alliance.

Finally, a word about Gehlen's personal goal. My last conversation with Reinhard Gehlen was in the simple circumstances of his home at Berg on Strarnberger See. He was obviously on his death bed, weak, drawn and barely able to communicate. Herta Gehlen sat in a chair at the foot of his bed. His last words to me, uttered with a visible effort, was an expression of appreciation for what I had done to help him achieve "den Traum meines Lebens -- Der Dienst."


J. Critchfield 22 September 1988

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IDEAS

US-Nazi spies: cold-war blunder

BLOWBACK: AMERICA'S RECRUITMENT OF NAZIS AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE COLD WAR

by Christopher Simpson
New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
398 pp. Illustrated. \$19.95

By Merle Rubin

BLOWBACK is a term used by intelligence agents for the unforeseen negative consequences back home resulting from covert actions abroad: As in the old proverb, spit in the wind and the wind blows it back at you.

The blowback from America's recruitment of Nazis and their collaborators to serve as spies and operatives after World War II is hard to assess. But thanks to the Freedom of Information Act and the path-breaking research of a young investigative reporter who availed himself of its opportunities, this story is no longer vague conjecture.

The aims of this book are fourfold: First, to document that Nazis were indeed recruited. Second, to establish that many were not minor functionaries or opportunists who became Nazis just to get ahead, but men who would otherwise have been condemned as war criminals. Third, to demonstrate that, despite their routine denials, most of the people who recruited Nazis were fully aware of their backgrounds. Fourth, and most difficult, to assess the damage.

Simpson succeeds in establishing the facts beyond any reasonable doubt. From scientists like Wernher von Braun and Walter Dornberger to spies and agents like Klaus Barbie, Alois Brunner, and Otto von Bolschwing, Simpson details case after case.

The pattern soon becomes depressingly predictable: Nazis recruited in full knowledge of their backgrounds; public denials and cover-ups; intervention by intelligence agencies when the immigration service tried to block the entry of war criminals and when investigative agencies tried to track them down. Simpson shows how recruiting Nazis may well have undermined American intelligence-gathering abilities, contributed to cold-war tensions, strengthened pro-Soviet regimes, and insidiously shaped the US

foreign policy debate.

Respected US policymakers like George F. Kennan, Charles Thayer, and Charles Bohlen had deemed it foolish to reject all Nazis and Nazi collaborators as potential allies in the postwar quest for "containment" of communism.

Simpson is not naive — or paranoid — enough to suppose that the cold war itself is attributable to the influence of Nazi intelligence recruits. He realizes that, on the contrary, it was America's anti-Soviet position that opened the door to Nazi collaborators on the old any-enemy-of-theirs-must-be-a-friend-of-ours principle.

CIA director Allen Dulles's comment about the recruitment of Nazi spymaster Reinhard Gehlen sums up the then-prevailing attitude: "He's on our side and that's all that matters."

Later, other analysts would reach a very different conclusion, calling the Gehlen hiring "the biggest mistake the US ever made."

BOOKS

The Gehlen organization was a major source of US intelligence during the most crucial period of East-West relations. Its most glaring weakness was exposed in the early 1960s, when Heinz Felfe, one of the Nazis whom Gehlen had recruited on the "old boy" network, was revealed to have been a Soviet double agent. A more subtle weakness may have been that the intelligence collected by more "reliable" Nazis was often distorted by their extremist world views. Worse yet, in inter- and intra-agency rivalries, extremists frequently prevailed over more dispassionate and genuinely reliable sources by purging them through McCarthyite tactics.

Simpson succeeds in making this shocking story all too believable. He is sophisticated and tough-minded in making connections and interpreting evidence, yet refreshingly uncynical in his belief that distinctions between good and evil still matter. There's much more to Simpson's highly detailed, grimly fascinating account than can be summarized here. But even a cursory examination of the evidence is enough to indicate the magnitude of the consequences set in motion by a policy that proved, as the saying goes, worse than a crime, a blunder.

Merle Rubin reviews books regularly for the Monitor.

Obituaries

Reinhard Gehlen, Ex-Chief of Bonn Spies

STARNBERG, West Germany, June 10 (AP) — Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, 77, the first chief of the West German intelligence service, died of cancer Friday night at his home in this mountain resort near Munich, a spokesman said yesterday.

Gen. Gehlen's book "Der Dienst" ("The Service") was a best seller in 1971. It claimed that Martin Bormann, Hitler's deputy, spied for the Soviet Union and died there. The claim was discounted when a skull identified as that of Bormann by his former dentist was unearthed at a construction site in West Berlin.

Gen. Gehlen joined the Reichswehr, the Weimar defense force, in 1920. He went to the Defense Ministry as a captain in 1935 and later was assigned to the general staff. As a colonel in 1942, Gen. Gehlen took over a German army intelligence branch working on the Soviet front to assess Soviet forces.

As the Third Reich approached defeat in April 1945, Gen. Gehlen fell into disfavor with Hitler, who said that his analysis of the Soviet front was "completely idiotic." Hit-

ler fired him a few days before the end of the war and replaced him with Lt. Col. Gerhard Wessel, who later succeeded Gen. Gehlen as chief of West German intelligence.

Gen. Gehlen approached the U.S. forces invading Germany in 1945 and was taken to Washington for questioning. He returned in 1946 to establish the Gehlen Organization, employing many former aides in intelligence gathering. In 1955, his organization became the official West German intelligence agency, directly responsible to the chancellor. Gen. Gehlen retired in 1968.

Sir Colin Coote

LONDON, June 10 (AP) — Sir Colin Coote, 85, the managing editor of the Daily Telegraph from 1950 to 1964 and a close friend of Churchill, died Friday at his London home.

Sir Colin was elected to the House of Commons in 1917. He had been wounded in World War I and decorated for distinguished service as a captain.

He left politics and entered journalism in 1922 as Rome correspondent for the Times of London. He began working for the Daily Telegraph in 1942.

Forrest Carter

ABILENE, Texas, June 10 (AP) — Forrest Carter, a Western novelist, died Thursday after an apparent heart attack.

Mr. Carter was best known for his novel "Gone with the Wind" and the movie "The Outlaw Josey Wales," which was based on the Tennessee native, who was in his mid-50s when he died, said that he was unsure of his birth date.

Ralph Lewis

CAMBRIDGE, Mass., June 10 (AP) — Ralph Lewis, 61, the editor of the Harvard Business Review and a director of several corporations, died Thursday on a business trip in Paris.

Mr. Lewis, a native of Dayton, Ohio, was a special agent for the FBI from 1941 to 1945 and assistant controller of Time Inc. from



Gen. Reinhard Gehlen

1945 to 1951. He then served for a year as assistant managing editor of Fortune magazine.

After working for a management consulting firm, Mr. Lewis joined Arthur Young and Co., the accounting firm, in 1954. He remained there until 1971, when he became editor of the Harvard Business Review.

Mr. Lewis served as a director of several organizations, including Houghton Mifflin Co., Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, and 20th Century-Fox Film Corp.

Professor Dr. Theodor Maunz †

Deutschland verlor seinen größten Rechtsgelehrten Dr. Frey seinen wunderbaren Wegbegleiter

Ein Vierteljahrhundert, vom Ende der sechziger Jahre bis zu seinem Tode, hat Deutschlands maßgeblichster Rechtsgelehrter Prof. Dr. Theodor Maunz die DEUTSCHE NATIONAL-ZEITUNG und Dr. Gerhard Frey nicht nur als Berater und Rechtsexperte begleitet. Rund eineinhalb Jahrzehnte hindurch fungierte Prof. Maunz praktisch als Mitherausgeber, der allwöchentlich in stundenlangen Besprechungen mit Dr. Frey die politischen, rechtlichen und journalistischen Themen auslotete und meist Woche für Woche, häufig auf Seite 3, selbst zu entscheidenden Problemen Stellung nahm.

Daß Prof. Maunz, dessen bestimmender Grundgesetzkomentar großen Einfluß auf die Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts nach wie vor ausübt und dessen Werke wie „Deutsches Staatsrecht“ Hunderttausende Studenten mit Wissen füllten und füllten, ganz und gar auf die freiheitliche demokratische Rechtsordnung



Die General-Gehlen-Medaille in der Serie „Große Deutsche“ des FZ-Verlags (Anzeige Seite 7).

unseres Staates stets ausgerichtet waren, ist selbstverständlich. Wenn die höchsten Richter die Rechtsauslegung von Prof. Maunz gewissermaßen als Richtschnur akzeptierten und wenn unsere Zeitungen wie auch die VOLKS-UNION in allen maßgeblichen Prozes-

sen stets obsiegten, so sind dies überzeugende Beweise für die nahtlose Übereinstimmung mit Verfassung, Gesetz und dem gesamten Recht.

Hervorragende Persönlichkeiten

Selbstverständlich wirkte und wirkt eine ganze Reihe der hervorragendsten Persönlichkeiten bei uns mit. Nachfolgend einige Briefausschnitte des langjährigen Beraters von Dr. Frey, General Reinhard Gehlen, des legendären Chefs deutscher Geheimdienste, darunter des Bundesnachrichtendienstes. Daß General Gehlen und Dr. Frey eine freundschaftliche Beziehung bis zum Tod des Geheimdienstchefs verband und daß überhaupt führende Persönlichkeiten uns unbeirrbar zur Seite stehen, ist so normal, daß es in die verqueren Vorstellungswelt von Meinungsmachern nicht paßt.

Beachten Sie bitte in der Anzeige „Deutsche Medaillen“ auf Seite 7 die Medaille von General Gehlen im Rahmen der Serie „Große Deutsche“.

Zu den glänzenden der DEUTSCHTUNG und bew von Dr. Frey z. Tode der bekannu hin, Vater des linvirtuosen. Vi schrieb Moshe l ich für die NATi ter seinem Na gende Beiträge. she Menuhin au pressum als Lei schen Ressorts NATIONAL-ZEIT Obenstehend e Menuhin mit der „An die Nation ke Ihnen, daß Si rum eingeräumt ich mich an das nicht an Partei wenden kann und ne Gedanken of irgendenen red äußern darf. Mos

Terror Ska

Im niedersächs Ordensgemeinsch träger ihr 39. Jah führt. Im Mittelpun volle Totenerhrung war eine Abordnu bei der Zeremonie sich der gesamte F sehr eindrucksvol CDU-Bürgermeiste Gäste offiziell willk Einige hundert, Gesichtern auftrete versuchten nach k der Ordensgemeir dem: Zahlreiche „f eine und Gruppen bundesweit zu eir stration“ getomm

Herrlic

Grafen Hugen, der Angriff "über die Politik und Taktik der Sowjets, wo endlich handelt die Dinge zum klaren gebracht sind, meines Erachtens recht geschickt. Es ist vielleicht etwas zu gründlich, aber gut aufgearbeitet. In dem Kapitel Terrorismus wird endlich klar nachgewiesen, daß der Terrorismus in aller Kraft eine Angelegenheit der KGB ist - den Fakt. wußt man lange klar. Auch, hinsichtlich Größen und Kampfmittel an Ihre Frau nach von der mirigen Herr Reinhard Gehlen

Hand, daß die gesamten Terrorismus-Unternehmungen zentral gesteuert sind, wenn auch auf verschiedenen Wegen und über ein großes Netz, das so aufgebaut ist, daß seine Einheitlichkeit nicht erkennbar ist. Ich weiß nicht, ob Sie das Buch von John Barron "KGB" kennen? Es ist in deutscher Übersetzung im Scherz-Verlag erschienen, und ich weiß, daß das verwendete Material authentisch ist. In diesem Buch gibt z.B. das 11. Kapitel - das Komplott zur Zerstörung Mexikos, S. 293 - einen interessanten Einblick in Parallellfälle.

Wir haben diesen Geburtstag, der keine runde Zahl hatte, gemütlich im kleinen Familienkreis gefeiert, im Beisein von 7 unserer 9 Enkel. Eine herzliche Empfehlung an Ihre Frau.

Mit bestem Gruß

Ihr

Reinhard Gehlen

zeit wach werden - nebenbei: Ich bin Humanist gewesen und habe für solche Dinge besonderes Interesse.

Ihr Artikel über die gegenwärtig gegen mich noch laufenden Angriffe hat gut getan, zumal die systematische Kampagne gegen mich wegen der von mir verfochtenen Ansicht über die deutsche Ostpolitik nicht so schnell zu hören wird. Immerhin schüttelt man den Kopf, was dem deutschen Vaterlande heutzutage alles möglich ist. Sie wissen ja, daß ich parteipolitisch nicht Stellung nehmen kann, da ich in der Vergangenheit stets der großen ganzen dienen mußte und auch jetzt mich dann am wirkungsvollsten äußern kann, wenn ich diese parteipolitische Neutralität zumindest formal in Anspruch nehmen kann.

Mit besten Grüßen und einem besonderen Gruß an Ihre Frau, deren Geburtstag ich heute feiere.

Ihr

Reinhard Gehlen

teil nach Lesen dieses Buches besteht noch aus der Feststellung, daß es verwunderlich ist, was für bemerkenswerte Leute in der Zeit nach dem Kriege zum Teil in leitenden Stellen bei deutschen Behörden es zu etwas gebracht haben und noch dazu solche, die für die Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik verantwortlich sind.

Es hat besonders meine Frau gefreut, Ihre Frau Gemahlin einmal kennenzulernen, die sie ebenso wie früher schon ich sehr sympathisch fand.

Mit Empfehlungen an Ihre Frau und besten Grüßen an Sie, auch von meiner Frau, bin ich

Ihr

Reinhard Gehlen

DWZ, 22.10.83

Stil verletzt?

Merkur
25.6.79

„Die Zeit“ widmete in ihren Ausgaben vom 26. Juli 1963 „Gehlens Geheimdienst“ und vom 26. April 1968 „Der Mann ohne Gesicht“ — General Reinhard Gehlen blickt zurück“ dem Schöpfer des Bundesnachrichtendienstes aus der Feder der Gräfin Dönhoff ausführliche, menschlich warmerzogene Artikel, in denen Persönlichkeit und Leistung gewürdigt wurden.

Zum Tod des am 8. Juni 1979

nach langer Krankheit verstorbenen Generals begnügte sich „Die Zeit“ am 15. Juni 1979 mit ein paar mageren Zeilen von „Dff“ unter der Überschrift „Stil verletzt“. Kein Wort zur geschichtlichen Leistung des Generals für unseren Staat; kein Versuch kritischer Würdigung — nur ein Schlußsatz, der fast verächtlich klingt. Stil verletzt?

Gerhard Wessel
(Ehemaliger Chef des BND)

Jürg von Kalckreuth: Leserbrief an Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11.6.1979

(An den Verfasser des Artikels in der SZ am 11.6. über R.Gehlen)

Sehr geehrter Herr Meyer,

Es tut mir leid, daß Sie so wenig Ahnung vom Leben, Wirken und der Persönlichkeit des verstorbenen Generals Gehlen haben, daß Sie heute -vier Tage vor seiner Beerdigung- einen solch abwertenden Artikel über diesen hochverdienten Mann schreiben konnten.

Chefs von Geheimdiensten sind meist in der Öffentlichkeit unbekannte Persönlichkeiten. Das regt gelegentlich zu Spekulationen über ihr Denken und Handeln an.

Was Sie da als Nachruf fabriziert haben, ist ein böswilliger und unfairer Bericht über einen grade Verstorbenen, der als Lebender Hitler die Stirn bot und der der jungen Bundesrepublik große Dienste geleistet hat. Seien Sie sicher, dieser Mann war im Leben und ist im Grabe über ihren entstellenden Nachruf erhaben.

Sehr geehrter Herr Meyer, ich gebe Ihnen den Rat: lesen und lernen Sie erst Geschichte, bevor Sie über sie urteilen.

Mit freundlichem Gruß !

(Brief wurde bisher nicht veröffentlicht; Herr M. hat sich in einem pers. Brief an mich zu rechtfertigen versucht).

Stets ein ehrendes Gedenken bewahren

Zu dem Nachruf „Im Geheimdienst vieler Herren“ von Claus Heinrich Meyer in der SZ vom 11. 6.:

Als 1. Präsident des Deutschen Soldaten- und Kriegerbundes in Bayern muß ich gegen den infamen Nachruf über den verstorbenen ehemaligen Leiter des Bundesnachrichtendienstes, Generalmajor a. D. Heinrich Gehlen, protestieren.

Wir wären kein Kameradschaftsbund, wenn wir uns gegen eine so einseitige und bösartige Kritik gegenüber einem toten Kameraden, der sich nicht mehr zur Wehr setzen kann, nicht Verwahrung einlegen wollten.

„De mortuis nil nisi bene“ – Die Art und Weise, wie die *Süddeutsche Zeitung* diesen von ihr mög-

licherweise als antiquiert angesehenen Spruch in unsere heutige Zeit übersetzt, ist kein Ruhmesblatt für Ihre Zeitung. Sicherlich braucht bei einem Nachruf für eine so bedeutende Persönlichkeit nicht jegliche Kritik unterdrückt werden. Wenn der Artikelschreiber aber dem Verstorbenen Einseitigkeit vorwirft, dann ist dies für die Art und Weise seiner eigenen Darstellung in noch viel verstärkterem Maße zutreffend. Es scheint mir für Ihre Zeitung auch als etwas zu billig, die Tatsache eines Ablebens zu benutzen, um die aus durchsichtigen Gründen hochgezogene und gezielte Verächtlichmachung aller (natürlich nur westlichen) Geheimdienste vor der Öffentlichkeit erneut auszubreiten.

Die ehemaligen Kameraden des General von

Gehlen werden diesem jedenfalls stets ein ehrendes Gedenken bewahren, das wir bei der *deutschen Zeitung* allerdings sowieso nicht erwartet haben.

Koch-Erpach, Brigadegeneral a. Bw. a. D.
Deutscher Soldaten- u. Krieger Bund
in Bayern e.V.
Karl-Theodor-Straße 54/I
8000 München 40

Der Treueeid ergab sich aus der Lage

Herr Reinhard Gehlen hat nicht vielen Hegegedient, wie der Verfasser behauptet, sondern Offizier Deutschland und Deutschlands. Der Treueeid auf Hitler schwören und ihm die Treue halten, ergab sich aus der Lage. Hitler war zur Macht gekommen.

Mit der Aufzählung der Persönlichkeiten, die Gehlen Vorgesetzte gewesen sein sollen, und der Verfasser viele Menschen und Dinge in ein Topf, und so entsteht ein falsches Bild. Wenn man diesen Artikel liest, bekommt man den Eindruck, daß Gehlen seinen Mantel nach dem Wind wusch. Nichts lag ihm ferner. Der Artikel gibt ein einseitiges und bestimmt nicht zutreffendes Bild von Gehlen.

Mich wundert es, daß die *Süddeutsche Zeitung* einen so unschönen Nachruf bringt.

M. v. Wallenberg Pachaly
Waldstraße 33
8131 Eerg über Starnberg

Wie es die Rangordnung vorschreibt

Es ist mir unfählich, wie eine Zeitung, die Rang und Ihres Namens in einer derart sachlichen und gehässigen Tonart von einem gerade eben verstorbenen hochverdienten Mann dem General Gehlen – sprechen kann.

Ihre politische Einstellung zu dem Thema muß beiseite gelassen, zitieren Sie Margret Frei, die die Zusammenfassung, wenn alles Gehlen „gedient“ habe, als die am meisten zu bewertende Leistung des Generals herausstellt. Ein Offizier, wie es die Rangordnung mit der Unterscheidungsverhältnissen vorschreibt, verschiedensten Chefs (um nur Halder, Zeitzler und Guderian zu nennen) unterstand, ist Herr Claus Heinrich Meyer offenbar nicht bekannt. „Gedient“ hat General Gehlen auf Grund seines Eides dem Staat und dem Volk. – Es wundert mich nicht nur – mich, daß Herr Dr. Heigert die Darstellung von Herrn Claus Heinrich Meyer die grobe Geschmackslosigkeit ist, zugelassen. Kein Ruhmesblatt für die *Süddeutsche*.

Charlotte Genth
Hubertusstraße 25
8022 Grünwald

Repräsentant eines geteilten Landes

Es mag sicher nicht leicht sein, einen Artikel über den ersten Präsidenten des BND zu schreiben, eine Fleißarbeit dürfte es denn auch wohl nicht geworden sein und mir blockieren die Fäden, wollte ich von einem Nachruf schreiben.

Demontiert hat er sich selbst, so lassen Sie Ihren Schlußpfiff ertönen und verschweigen so schamvoll Ihre Mitwirkung an eben dieser Demontage, für die Ihr Artikel eben den Beweis antritt.

Bei der Würdigung des Reinhard Gehlen wird eben leicht vergessen, daß der die Aufbauleistung an der entscheidenden Stelle erbracht hat, daß er mehr leistete, als die Erkenntnisse aus Fremde Heere Ost zu kopieren. Gerade er war das, was die von Ihnen zitierte Margret Boveri für Otto John gelten ließ, der Repräsentant des gespaltenen Landes. Seine Aufgabenstellung und die der ihm nachgeordneten Behörde war damit kaum einem „emotionalen, alles überlagernden Antikommunismus“ entsprungen. Der kann nur dann so sehen, wenn man Ursache und Wirkung verwechselt.

Einen Trost aus Ihrem Artikel vermag ich daraus zu schöpfen, daß Sie nicht die Kuckuckschneise Feife-Frenzel-Clemens-Tief zu Colin Clark, Präsidenten in ihrem Abgang allein zur Last legen.

Wohl eher zufällig las ich heute über den Ehrenschutz im Verbandsblättchen des DJV *Der Journalist* Nr. 6 Juni 79. In dieser Angelegenheit hat der Studienkreis für Presserecht und Presso-

freiheit eine Tagung in Saarbrücken abgehalten. Dabei war auch vom Schutz des Kritisierten die Rede. Nicht jeder Betroffene, so einer der Referenten (Oberlandesgerichtspräsident a. D. Richard Schmid) habe Zugang zu den Medien und könne zum „Gegenschlag“ ausholen. Dies dürfte erfahrungsgemäß für einen Verstorbenen „erfahrungsgemäß“ äußerst schwierig sein und zudem für einen Vertreter der Geheimdienste. Hier zeigt sich die Problematik der Kritik an Leuten, die sich insgesamt von ihrer Aufgabenstellung her nicht in der Form verteidigen können, die adäquat wäre. Englands Pressefreiheit hat wohl bis dato nicht unter der Form der D-notice in Geheimdienstdingen gelitten, warum sollte es in der Bundesrepublik anders sein?

Udo Abich
Thomastraße 53
1000 Berlin 44

Tote können sich nicht mehr wehren

Die in dem Artikel über Herrn General a. D. Gehlen getroffene Würdigung seiner Leistungen und Verdienste ist unsachlich und unfair. Es hätte dem Verfasser gut angestanden, eine derartige Publikation zu Leuten des Betroffenen herauszugeben. Tote können sich leider (Gott sei Dank?) nicht mehr wehren.

Hans Jürgen Giebenhain, Major
Rosenheimer Landstraße 6a
8012 Ottobrunn

Er diente immer nur dem Vaterland

Niemand wird einen Einwand erheben, wenn eine Zeitung von Rang einen kritischen Nachruf zum Tode eines Geheimdienstchefs veröffentlicht, d. h. die Verdienste und Fehler eines solchen Mannes gegeneinander abwägt, dessen vom Staat gestellte Aufgabe ungewöhnliche Probleme mit sich bringt deren Bewältigung wiederum eine ungewöhnliche Persönlichkeit erfordert.

Schlimm wird es jedoch, wenn eine solche Zeitung es verantwortlich duldet, daß ein Journalist, der ihm gewährte berufliche Freiheit – unter Nichtachtung der ihm daraus entstehenden ethischen Verpflichtung – mißbraucht, um einen Toten zu schmähen und seine ehemalige Berufsgruppe sowie seine soziale Gruppe herabzusetzen. Gibt es für einen Journalisten den Begriff „Anstand“ nicht, und ist es ihm gestattet, ihm nicht genehme oder verständliche Personengruppen öffentlich und irreführend herabzusetzen?

Der Sachverhalt wird beklagenswerter dadurch, daß dem Journalisten M. Fehler in seinem Artikel unterliefen, die von Unkenntnis der Person und Tatsachen zeugen. General G. war kein Mann, der einer Person diente! Er diente seinem Vaterland. Ein Versuch, ihn als Opportunisten darzustellen wäre ebenso lächerlich wie perfide.

Er diente nie Hitler, er diente seinem Vaterland unter Hitler. Halder, Zeitzler und Guderian waren im Wechsel Dienstvorgesetzte. Wechsel, die auf G. besten Falles sachlichen Einfluß hatten. Canaris, Himmler und Schellenberg waren G. nie vorgesetzt, er hat also auch ihnen nie gedient. Ist nach Meinung von M. der General G. zu schmähen, weil er versuchte, als Patriot seine Pflicht bestmöglich zu tun?

Den Wert der Arbeit des General G. zu beurteilen, übersteigt die fachliche Qualifikation des Journalisten M. Er sollte dieses besser hierzu Be-

ruferen überlassen. Kurzum, M. hat als Journalist weder dem Informationsbedürfnis der Öffentlichkeit noch dem Ruf seiner Zeitung noch einem wünschenswerten Pluralismus einen guten Dienst getan. Als Mensch sollte er sich für diesen Artikel schämen.

v. dem Knesebeck
Bannzaunweg 15 A
8024 Deisenhofen

Ganz schön übler Nachruf

Da haben Sie ja dem armen Herrn Gehlen – kaum daß er ins Grab gesunken – einen ganz schön üblen Nachruf gewidmet. Haben Sie da nicht ein bißchen sehr übertrieben? Und haben Sie – bevor Sie das schöne Pamphlet in die Rotationsmaschine abgelassen haben – auch mal im Archiv nachgeschaut, was die SZ vor noch nicht allzu langer Zeit über G. an die Öffentlichkeit losgelassen hat? Und damit hat sie sich doch wohl auch identifiziert – oder? (Also bitte lesen Sie doch mal nach: SZ Nr. 285, Region Bad Tölz/Wolfratshausen vom 10./11. 12. 1977.)

Ich finde es ganz gut, daß es in einer „labilen Phase“ der Nachkriegsgeschichte jemanden mit einem Blick nach Osten (fixiert oder nicht) gegeben hat. Dahin haben später viele – insbesondere aus den Reihen der lieben SPD und von den Genossen Wehner und Brandt angeführt – mit einer zu sehr rosa gefärbten Prille hingeschickt.

Lasser – also die Kirche im Dorf und betrachten wir das Bemühen mit weniger boshaftem Ressentiment wie Sie es in diesem so schnell verfaßten „Nachruf“ getan haben.

Konrad Müller
Kirchsteinstraße 20
8172 Lenggries/Obb.

Im Geheimdienst vieler Herren

Die Legende des Bundesnachrichtenchefs Reinhard Gehlen wurde nach seinem Abschied vom Amt rissig

Von unserem Redaktionsmitglied Claus Heinrich Meyer

München, 10. Juni

Der Sinn des Lebens war „der Dienst“, der geheime Dienst und innerhalb des Dienstes unter allen Herren war er auf eine einzige Himmelsrichtung fixiert: auf den Osten. Reinhard Gehlen aber war und blieb von den Zeiten, vom verhaßten Zeitgeist unberührt bis zu seinem Ende — außerdienstlich und innerdienstlich; er war immer preußischer Generalstabsoffizier. Diese Herkunft, ihre Traditionen, die geistige Erziehung verdunkelten seine „Erkenntnisse“ — erkennen nicht im Sinne des humanistischen Selbst-Erkennens (der Anweisung an die Suchenden am Apollon-Tempel zu Delphi), nein, diese Erkenntnis wächst nur im Plural und trifft den tatsächlichen oder vermeintlichen Gegner, den inneren oder äußeren Feind, den „geistigen“. Dadurch, daß er sich nicht reflektierte, wie die ihm und seinem Denken wohlgesinnte Welt schrieb, als der Mythos des Generals a. D. Reinhard Gehlen nach dem Abschied vom Bundesnachrichtendienst allmählich rissig wurde, weil man in den Geheimnistuer von Staats wegen allzuviel hineingeheimnist hatte, dadurch machte er seine Geschäfte, wurde groß, wurde allen Herren unentbehrlich und führte das preußische Prinzip eines absoluten, scheinbar wertneutralen Staatsverständnisses ad absurdum.

Emotionaler Antikommunismus

Diese Zusammenhänge hat man in der deutschen Öffentlichkeit erst sehen können, als Gehlen pensioniert, öffentlich wurde und auch selbst veröffentlichte „Der Dienst“ hieß das Buch (1971), in dem sich Gehlen dürr und falsch erinnerte, in welchem er sein Weltbild ausbreitete, seinen emotionalen, alles überlagernden Antikommunismus, sein Credo: Die Tot ist alles — oder in militärischer Kurzform: losschlagen! — wie er es nachträglich auch noch als das richtige Handeln für vergangene Nachkriegskrisen empfahl. Aber außerdem stand da noch die älterseitsamste Bemerkung, allen Ernstes: Martin Bormann, Hitlers Reichsleiter, sei ein Agent Moskaus gewesen — wenn doch Gehlen diesen Unsinn früher publiziert hätte. Aber in seinen mächtigsten Jahren, der Ära Adenauer und der seines unmittelbaren Dienstvorgesetzten Staatssekretär Globke, hätte man auch das glaubend entgegengenommen.

Reinhard Gehlen, am 3. April 1902 in Erfurt geboren, hat eine deutsche Karriere gemacht. 1920, nach dem verlorenen Ersten Weltkrieg, trat er in die Reichswehr ein, weil eben auch sein Vater Offizier gewesen war. Er wurde stetig befördert, er hatte ausgezeichnete Beurteilungen, er wurde 1933 zur Generalstabsausbildung nach Berlin kommandiert. Im Krieg, dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, avancierte er in den Stäben, und 1942 endlich übernahm Gehlen die Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost im Generalstab des Heeres — die Zen-

trale der Ost-Feindaufklärung, in der die „Feindlage“ entworfen wurde als Grundlage operativer Entscheidungen.

Es waren jene Jahre bis zum Kriegsende, in denen die Legende Gehlen gelegt wurde: der Mann, der Hitler die Wahrheit zukommen ließ; der Mann, der sich zwischen Abwehrchef Admiral Canaris und SS zu halten verstand; der Mann, der rechtzeitig sein Geheimdienst-Archiv kopierte! Der Mann, der für die Amerikaner (sprich: den amerikanischen Geheimdienst) so wichtig war, daß in einem Akt der Kameraderie ohnegleichen Gehlen und sein Apparat gleich weitermachen konnten, als „Organisation Gehlen“ zunächst — und 1953, zehn Jahre nach Kriegsende, unter dem sanktionierenden Titel „Bundesnachrichtendienst“. Immer an der Spitze einer Feindlagen-Konjunktur, die jetzt Kalter Krieg hieß. Margaret Boveri hat einmal zusammengezählt, erstaunt, wem alles Gehlen hat dienen können und vorausgesetzt, daß dies einmal als die am meisten zu bewundernde Leistung des Generals erscheinen werde: erst die demokratische Weimarer Republik — danach hießen seine Vorgesetzten Hitler, Halder, Zeitzler, Guderian, Canaris, Himmler, Schellenberg, Allan Dulles,

Globke und Adenauer; alles mit fließenden Übergängen.

Später, nach Beendigung des „Dienstes“, als Gehlen schon mit dem Großen Verdienstkreuz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ausgezeichnet worden war, kam durch die Untersuchungsberichte des ehemaligen Staatssekretärs Mercker und während der Verhandlungen des Guillaume-Ausschusses im Bundestag die Wahrheit ans Licht: Gehlen hatte auch im Inland „spioniert“, Dossiers über deutsche (oppositionelle) Politiker anlegen lassen und ihr Vorhandensein geleugnet. Gehlen war, wie man in einer der genauesten Analysen der Geheimdienste in der Bundesrepublik nachlesen kann (Thomas Walde: ND-Report), auf das l'art-pour-l'art-Spiel Genspionage fixiert, er hat den Osten immerzu rot gesehen und dadurch andere Himmelsgegenden übersehen. Er hatte sich schließlich mit einer Crew von Generalstäblern umgeben, deren kräftigste Eigenschaft ihr Corpsgeist war und manchmal auch ihre frühere SS-Zugehörigkeit, kaum aber ihre analytischen Fähigkeiten. Die Legende Gehlen konnte nur solange blühen, jahrzehntelang immerhin, solange niemand ihn (er)kannte. Demontiert hat er sich selbst.



AUCH IM INLAND „spioniert“ und Dossiers über oppositionelle Politiker angelegt: Reinhard Gehlen 1971 vor dem Guillaume-Untersuchungsausschuß.

SE, 11.6.79

Lebanon, Nov. 6, '99

Williamson, Garrison, Mr. Marshall!

Wm. Keelwell, Henry, Wanda

George W. Lee, Gaydon, Gammard

Robert O. Lee

Wanda (Hicks)

William W. Lee

L. v. Marshall

W. Lee

Wanda Lee + Elmer

Wanda Lee

Wanda + Wanda

Wanda Lee

Wanda Lee

Alf M. Lanza

Dr Oth Schull and Beate Schull

June 30, 1988


Burton Hersh
Box 204
Bradford, New Hampshire 03221

Dear Mr. Hersh,

My expressed reservations on discussing the Gehlen story have been three: (1) Such discussions, to be useful, take quite a lot of time -- a commodity I value highly with competing interests and demands. (2) I am in the process of doing some writing and research on the same subject. (3) I am basically convinced that, aside from some of the commission reports of the past that led to positive actions on the intelligence capabilities of the nation, articles and books on intelligence serve no useful purpose, other than whatever commercial value the publishers and authors extract.

Have said all of the above, I have discussed your effort with Dick Helms and am prepared to spend some time with you. It would probably contribute to the effort if you were to send me a brief listing of the historical points that interest you. I would give them thought in advance. I will be on vacation or travelling on business most of July. I will be in the office on the 6th and 7th of July. Ms. Lee Miller, my administrative assistant, can be reached at this number most of the time.

Sincerely,



Do not mail
until JHC talks
to Amb. Helms.

Burton Hersh and the Gehlen-Wisner Conspiracy Myth

July 12, 1988

Hersh describes himself as a trained biographer historian who has spent much time in the past seven years attempting to write a "definitive history of American intelligence in the past 50 years." He appears to be about 50 years old; says he served as a postwar GI in Germany, went to school there later and has spent considerable time in Germany. His few brief lapses into German gave me the impression that it is good, perhaps native. He does not, however, have a noticeable foreign accent. He lives in New England.

I saw Hersh on 8 July 1988 after repeated refusals to meet with him. I did so on the advice of Dick Helms who feels that Hersh is into the myth that Frank Wisner and Reinhard Gehlen were co-conspirators who worked closely in the late 1940s and early to mid-1950s in attempting to organize Eastern European displaced persons left in the West at the end of WW II.

Neither Dick Helms nor I know of any direct connection whatsoever between Wisner and Gehlen. We find it inconceivable that any such connection existed without our knowledge. I do not believe that Wisner ever visited Pullach and have no recollection of any substantive contact between Gehlen and Wisner when Gehlen made his only visit to CIA in Washington in 1951. Gehlen's Eastern European experts did, of course, know Jonny von Herwarth, Hilger and others who overlapped in Moscow with Chip Bohlen and others well known to Wisner. I never had the impression that Gehlen personally pursued these German connections with the State Department very closely. On the other hand, at the Munich level, Eastern European personalities involved with OPC DP operations, RFE, AmComLib etc., undoubtedly were in touch with Gehlen's outside organizations in touch with Eastern European refugee groups. But none of this translates in any way to the central theme of Loftus and others that there was a top-level Gehlen-Wisner collaboration. After spending two hours with Hersh I was left with the impression that Frank Wisner is indeed the center piece of his work and that he has accepted that there is too much "evidence" to support the story of Wisner-Gehlen cooperation to set it aside; but he admits that he has not found enough evidence to adopt the much circulated story as an historical truth. On the basis of this single conversation with him, I am convinced that pursuing this issue is the main item on his agenda. He showed interest in no other element of my years of association with Reinhard Gehlen.

For a professed historian with seven years of research behind his effort, I found enormous and quite obvious gaps

in his knowledge on intelligence history of postwar Germany but evidence of some depth on the history of Central Europe after the early thirties. He made references to Schellenberg, Baun, Willi Hoettl, Augsburg, Franz Six, Skorzeny and various other well known personalities. He made repeated assertions that Gehlen heavily staffed parts of his organization with SD personalities.

He professed to have made an "in depth" study of the history of OPC and OSO, particularly as they evolved in Germany, but knew nothing at all about the much-publicized OPC expose' when stay-behinds et al were compromised in the early 1950s and covered heavily in the German press. He knew that General Truscott had written a very strong report after his return to Washington but assumed it was focused mainly on the Hungarian Revolt in 1956. Concerning that event, he was looking for data that the anti-communist legions formed by Wisner and Gehlen in the West had been poised to move into Poland and Hungary to carry out "The John Foster Dulles rollback of Communism in Eastern Europe." He was clearly dismayed to learn that I had been acting as head of the Eastern European Division at that time and nothing resembling his version of CIA history in the Hungarian Revolt had occurred.

Hersh's knowledge of the Gehlen organization appeared to center on the personalities associated with it who were in touch with or part of Eastern European refugee groups. He was familiar with the "Professoren Gruppe" which he asserted was headed by Franz Six "whom General Clay had locked up until 1952." He had obviously dug into the group personalities in and on-the-fringe of the Gehlen organization that were associated with Felfe. (The same circles that Mary Ellen Reese focused on in her several years of research in her biography of Gehlen.) Interestingly, her publisher withdrew from their contract after she became convinced that the Gehlen-Wisner story developed by Loftus et al was a myth unsupported by facts and refused to give it a central play in her book.

Hersh seemed most knowledgeable when he got into the circle of personalities, US and foreign, involved in Radio Free Europe, AmComLib and comparable operations.

Hersh dropped numerous CIA names, including Jim Angleton. He said he had many talks with Angleton and asserted that Angleton basically shared Wisner's belief that massive covert action would indeed have a chance in "rolling back" communism. Hersh asserted, for example, that in the early to mid-1950s Wisner was in touch with a Yugoslav that he and Angleton saw as a potential leader. I derided this as a ridiculous myth born of Wisner's association and known fascination with the ideas of a Yugoslav diplomat. But in

retrospect many of us saw this episode as the early phase of Frank Wisner's period of illness.

Toward the latter part of our conversation I told Hersh that I could only conclude that he was not a serious historian of intelligence but just one more journalist chasing the myth of Wisner and Gehlen collaborating in bringing legions of war criminals not only into the employment of CIA but also many of them into the United States.

I described Gehlen as obviously interested in Eastern Europe, the politics of the USSR and the communist governments of Eastern Europe and, above all, the intentions and capabilities of the Soviet forces centered on the central front of NATO as it emerged. I acknowledged that the Gehlen organization had staff and eastern experts following the politics of the anti-communist minorities, the organizations left stranded in Western Europe at the war's end and the whole business of emigre politics. But this whole subject, I said, was as a small item on Gehlen's 1946-1956 agenda and low on his priority list. Gehlen was preoccupied with relations with the Western countries, their intelligence services, the emerging political scene in West Germany and his complex problems of relationships with the ruling Adenauer government and the formidable SPD headed by Kurt Schumacher. But ultimately, Gehlen focused on laying the groundwork for the eventual acceptance and integration of his organization into the German government. In this context he was acutely concerned with Bonn perceptions of his handling of the sensitive issues of the NSDAP, the SD, the SS etc.

Hersh had the essential facts of my role in Germany. But he lacked anything resembling a realistic and balanced view of what had transpired. He raised the question of General Trudeau's success in penetrating the Gehlen organization and giving Adenauer the evidence. I attempted to put this incident in historical perspective as a lapse in Trudeau's judgement that resulted in his removal from his job -- but with no seeming damage to his military career.

He belabored the Otto von Bolschwing case and asserted that he had discovered that his motive in emigrating to the US was his discovery that the Gehlen organization was heavily penetrated. I dismissed this as nonsense in the case of von Bolschwing.

Hersh returned periodically to the Felfe case. I asked him if he had read Peter Wright's SPYCATCHER (he had) and said that any responsible intelligence organization in those years was going through comparable sifting and analysis of data on potential penetrations. Neither the Gehlen organization nor the CIA staff dealing with it were

exceptions. Long before Felte emerged we had narrowed an intense scrutiny for a Soviet penetration to a very small circle around Felte.

He asked if Angleton and his staff had assisted in the CI field. I told him that Jim Angleton and I were close friends and colleagues over many years and held continuing talks. However, there were excellent professional CI specialists at every level of the Agency and I was always well supported in CI analysis from CIA offices directly concerned with Germany and with Europe. He said that everything leads back to Jay Lovestone who was close to Angleton. Hersh twice quoted Angleton as sharing Wisner's views on the "rollback" theory. I said this was plain sense. I also said that the overall OPC concept starting in about 1950 of which Frank Wisner was the acknowledged architect, was very complex and had, in my view, good and bad aspects. I thought many of the international organizations supported by Cord Meyer's efforts deserved credit for keeping the communists off-balance for years. Hersh then commented on Irving Brown, Jay Lovestone et al and wondered whether this was not the Wisner link to Gehlen.

I acknowledged that Jay Lovestone was a well informed person on postwar politics in Germany and undoubtedly was closely associated with personalities that were closely associated with Gehlen. But I thought the relationship ended there.

I broke off the talk at the end of two hours. As he departed I told him bluntly that for a person claiming the standards and objectivity of a trained historian, I could only conclude that he was engaged in pursuing an historical myth. I had at least the claim to having known Gehlen and Wisner personally during the years that interested Hersh. From all I knew, he was chasing a story that never happened.

James H. Critchfield
12 July 1988

30 June

Copy sent to:

Amb. Helms

JAMES H. CRITCHFIELD
President

June 30, 1988


Burton Hersh
Box 204
Bradford, New Hampshire 03221

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Sincerely,



BURTON HERSH
BOX 204
BRADFORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE 03221
TP: 603-938-2196

June 19, 1988

James Kritchfield
Tetrattech
1911 Fort Myer Drive
Suite 403
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Kritchfield:

As I hope you remember, I'm a historian and biographer doing what I hope will be a definitive book on the American intelligence community 1919-1962. Obviously, your work with Reinhard Gehlen is an important element of this history. I've talked to at least a dozen people who have commented in some detail on your involvement with the Gehlen organization, a number from the Agency during the period as well as their military counterparts.

It seems important to me to get this straight. During a recent chat with Richard Helms (June 6) he strongly suggested that I talk with you; when I indicated that you had agreed, then hesitated to sit down with me, he urged me to try again.

I'm hoping with this book to establish the intelligence realities of the period and bring the details into an accurate historical proportion. Obviously, I'll have to deal with your career in Germany in any case, and would feel much more comfortable if you would respond directly.

Up or down, this will be my last effort to reach you. I'd like to avoid the sort of confusion that attended the publication of Tom Powers' book. At this point it's up to you.

Best wishes,


Burton Hersh

cc: Richard Helms

J H S copy

JAMES H. CRITCHFIELD
President

June 30, 1988

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Bradford, New Hampshire 03221

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Sincerely,

James H. Critchfield

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Cork Helms. He is
out too an.*

*Did Not
Send.*

*Spoke on
Phone.*

BURTON HERSH
BOX 204
BRADFORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE 03221
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Burton Hersh

cc: Richard Helms

BURTON HERSH
BOX 204
BRADFORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE 03221
TP: 603-938-2196

BURTON
HERSH

June 28, 1988

WISHER -
GEHLEN

James Critchfield
6630 Madison McLean Drive
McLean, Virginia 22101

Dear Mr. Critchfield:

As I hope you remember, I'm a historian and biographer doing what I hope will be a definitive book on the American intelligence community 1919-1962. Obviously, your work with Reinhard Gehlen is an important element of this history. I've talked to at least a dozen people who have commented in some detail on your involvement with the Gehlen organization, a number from the Agency during the period as well as their military counterparts.

It seems important to me to get this straight. During a recent chat with Richard Helms (June 6) he strongly suggested that I talk with you; when I indicated that you had agreed, then hesitated to sit down with me, he urged me to try again.

I'm hoping with this book to establish the intelligence realities of the period and bring the details into an accurate historical proportion. Obviously, I'll have to deal with your career in Germany in any case, and would feel much more comfortable if you would respond directly.

Up or down, this will be my last effort to reach you. I'd like to avoid the sort of confusion that attended the publication of Tom Powers' book. At this point it's up to you.

Best wishes,

Burton Hersh
Burton Hersh

P.S. After sending the above, a copy of which went to Richard Helms, he wrote me here to indicate that it was his impression that TetraTech International had been disbanded, and sent along the McLean address. I hope to be in Washington shortly in any case, perhaps in about ten days, and if you'll reconsider I'll do whatever I can to arrange a chat.

HERSH

Burton Hersh and the Gehlen-Wisner Conspiracy Myth

July 12, 1988

Hersh describes himself as a trained biographer historian who has spent much time in the past seven years attempting to write a "definitive history of American intelligence in the past 50 years." He appears to be about 50 years old; says he served as a postwar GI in Germany, went to school there later and has spent considerable time in Germany. His few brief lapses into German gave me the impression that it is good, perhaps native. He does not, however, have a noticeable foreign accent. He lives in New England.

I saw Hersh on 8 July 1988 after repeated refusals to meet with him. I did so on the advice of Dick Helms who feels that Hersh is into the myth that Frank Wisner and Reinhard Gehlen were co-conspirators who worked closely in the late 1940s and early ~~to~~ mid-1950s in attempting to organize Eastern European displaced persons left in the West at the end of WW II.

Neither Dick Helms nor I know of any direct connection whatsoever between Wisner and Gehlen. We find it inconceivable that any such connection existed without our knowledge. I do not believe that Wisner ever visited Pullach and have no recollection of any substantive contact between Gehlen and Wisner when Gehlen made his only visit to CIA in Washington in 1951. Gehlen's Eastern European experts did, of course, know Jonny von Herwarth, Hilger and others who overlapped in Moscow with Chip Bohlen and others well known to Wisner. I never had the impression that Gehlen personally pursued these German connections with the State Department very closely. On the other hand, at the Munich level, Eastern European personalities involved with OPC DF operations, RFE, AmComLib etc. undoubtedly were in touch with Gehlen's outside organizations in touch with Eastern European refugee groups. But none of this translates in any way to the central theme of Loftus and others that there was a top-level Gehlen-Wisner collaboration. After spending two hours with Hersh I was left with the impression that Frank Wisner is indeed the center piece of his work and that he has accepted that there is too much "evidence" to support the story of Wisner-Gehlen cooperation to set it aside; but he admits that he has not found enough evidence to adopt the much circulated story as an historical truth. On the basis of this single conversation with him, I am convinced that pursuing this issue is the main item on his agenda. He showed interest in no other element of my years of association with Reinhard Gehlen.

For a professed historian with seven years of research behind his effort, I found enormous and quite obvious gaps in his knowledge on intelligence history of postwar Germany but evidence of some depth on the history of Central Europe after the early thirties. He made references to Schellenberg, Baun, Willi Hoetl, Augsburg, Franz Six, Skorzeny and various other well known

personalities. He made repeated assertions that Gehlen heavily staffed parts of his organization with SD personalities.

He professed to have made an "in depth" study of the history of OPC and OSO, particularly as they evolved in Germany, but knew nothing at all about the much-publicized OPC exposee when stay-behinds et al were compromised in the early 1950s and covered heavily in the German press. He knew that General Truscott had written a very strong report after his return to Washington but assumed it was focused mainly on the Hungarian Revolt in 1956. Concerning that event, he was looking for data that the anti-communist legions formed by Wisner and Gehlen in the West had been poised to move into Poland and Hungary to carry out "The John Foster Dulles rollback of Communism in Eastern Europe." He was clearly dismayed to learn that I had been acting as head of the Eastern European Division at that time and nothing resembling his version of CIA history in the Hungarian Revolt had occurred.

Hersh's knowledge of the Gehlen organization appeared to center on the personalities associated with it who were in touch with or part of Eastern European refugee groups. He was familiar with the "Professoren Gruppe" which he asserted was headed by Franz Six "whom General Clay had locked up until 1952." He had obviously dug into the group personalities in and on-the-fringe of the Gehlen organization that were associated with Felke. (The same circles that Mary Ellen Reese focused on in her several years of research in her biography of Gehlen.) Interestingly, her publisher withdrew from their contract after she became convinced that the Gehlen-Wisner story developed by Loftis et al was a myth unsupported by facts and refused to give it a central play in her book.

Hersh seemed most knowledgeable when he got into the circle of personalities, US and foreign, involved in Radio Free Europe, AmComLib and comparable operations.

Hersh dropped numerous CIA names, including Jim Angleton. He said he had many talks with Angleton and asserted that Angleton basically shared Wisner's belief that massive covert action would indeed have a chance in "rolling back" communism. Hersh asserted, for example, that in early to mid-1950s Wisner was in touch with a Yugoslav that he and Angleton saw as a potential leader. I derided this as a ridiculous myth born of Wisner's association and known fascination with the ideas of a Yugoslav diplomat. But in retrospect many of us saw this episode as the early phase of Frank Wisner's period of illness.

Toward the latter part of our conversation I told Hersh that I could only conclude that he was not a serious historian of intelligence but just one more journalist chasing the myth of Wisner and Gehlen collaborating in bringing legions of war criminals not only into the employment of CIA but also many of them into the United States.

I described Gehlen as obviously interested in Eastern Europe, the politics of the USSR and the communist governments of Eastern Europe and, above all, the intentions and capabilities of the Soviet forces centered on the central front of NATO as it emerged. I acknowledged that the Gehlen organization had staff and eastern experts following the politics of the anti-communist minorities, the organizations left stranded in Western Europe at the war's end and the whole business of emigre politics. But this whole subject, I said, was as a small item on Gehlen's 1946-1956 agenda and low on his priority list. Gehlen was preoccupied with relations with the Western countries, their intelligence services, the emerging political scene in West Germany and his complex problems of relationships with the ruling Adenauer government and the formidable SPD headed by Kurt Schumacher. But ultimately, Gehlen focused on laying the groundwork for the eventual acceptance and integration of his organization into the German government. In this context he was acutely concerned with Bonn perceptions of his handling of the sensitive issues of the NSDAP, the SD, the SS etc.

Hersh had the essential facts of my role in Germany. But he lacked anything resembling a realistic and balanced view of what had transpired. He raised the question of General Trudeau's success in penetrating the Gehlen organization and giving Adenauer the evidence. I attempted to put this incident in historical perspective as a lapse in Trudeau's judgement that result in his removal from his job -- but with no seeming damage to his military career.

He belabored the Otto von Bolschwing case and asserted that he had discovered that his motive in emigrating to the US was his discovery that the Gehlen organization was heavily penetrated. I dismissed this as nonsense in the case of von Bolschwing.

Hersh returned periodically to the Felte case. I asked him if he had read Peter Wright's SPYCATCHER (he had) and said that any responsible intelligence organization in those years was going through comparable sifting and analysis of data on potential penetrations. Neither the Gehlen organization nor the CIA staff dealing with it was an exception. Long before Felte emerged we had narrowed an intense scrutiny for a Soviet penetration to a very small circle around Felte.

He asked if Angleton and his staff had assisted in the CI field. I told him that Jim Angleton and I were close friends and colleagues over many years and held continuing talks. However, there were excellent professional CI specialists at every level of the Agency and I was always well supported in CI analysis from CIA offices directly concerned with Germany and with Europe. He said that everything leads back to Jay Lovestone who was close to Angleton. Hersh twice quoted Angleton as sharing Wisner's views on the "rollback" theory. I said this was plain nonsense. I also

said that the overall OPC concept starting in about 1950 of which Frank Wisner was the acknowledged architect was very complex and had, in my view, good and bad aspects. I thought many of the International Organizations supported by Cord Meyer's efforts deserved credit for keeping the communists off-balance for years. Hersh then commented on Irving Brown, Jay Lovestone et al and wondered whether this was not the Wisner link to Gehlen.

I acknowledged that Jay Lovestone was a well informed person on postwar politics in Germany and undoubtedly was closely associated with personalities that were closely associated with Gehlen. But I thought the relationship ended there.

I broke off the talk at the end of two hours. As he departed I told him bluntly that for a person claiming the standards and objectivity of a trained historian, I could only conclude that he was engaged in pursuing an historical myth. I had at least the claim to having known Gehlen and Wisner personally during the years that interested Hersh. From all I knew, he was chasing a story that never happened.

JHC 10 July 1988

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*Author memorably
focuses on our
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James H. Critchfield
12 July 1988

Book 25
Pelter - Wisner
Carbamide, has Red back
after Singapore
CRC

61300127

tsgbook2

The Role of the Gehlen Organization in Eastern European Refugee Affairs

Much has been written that assumes or asserts that Reinhard Gehlen and his organization played a major role in collaborating with the Americans, most specifically with Frank Wisner's Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), in efforts to organize a "roll back" of the controlling Soviet presence in Eastern Europe and in loosening the hold of the Communist regime on much of the USSR itself. There is probably no factual basis for this assertion for three reasons: (a) During the eight years that Gehlen was in direct and continuing contact with CIA, he showed no interest in contact with Frank Wisner and OPC. (b) Wisner, who by simply asking could have visited Pullach and met with Gehlen, never showed an interest in doing so. Gehlen, on his only visit to Washington in those eight years, met Wisner once at a reception given by the DCI. (c) The Germans -- Adenauer, Gehlen and the German military leaders who eventually took German forces in NATO, had well defined priorities by 1950; "rollback" and "liberation" as Wisner and his associates envisaged it was not on their agenda. But because these ideas were a continuing and major preoccupation in Washington and in OPC international operations and because the myth of collaboration between Gehlen and Wisner persists. I believe the matter deserves further investigation.

In Washington, containment of the Soviet threat by major military power and not a "rollback" employing secret armies became and remained US and allied policy. Its conception is usually associated with the Truman Doctrine dating from 1947. But a foreign policy objective of "liberating" countries and people under communist domination retained a powerful constituency within the American foreign policy establishment. The most that its advocates were able to achieve was to gain reluctant approval from all of the Presidents from Truman to Reagan to permit conduct of a massive propaganda operation and a covertly waged war to reverse the flow of the communist tide which swept through much of Eastern Europe behind the Red Army.

Containment based on an eventual standoff between Western and Soviet military power proved to be the sustained American policy over four decades. But in the late 1940s, through the 1950s and on into the early 1960s an active majority of the elite in the foreign policy field successfully advocated the testing and challenging, if only by committing Cold War instruments, the Soviet control of oppressed populations. Most of this "liberation" effort centered on western Eurasia with divided Germany the principal operational base of choice in most cases. There

were, however, also efforts made in Latin America and Asia; the concept of covertly undermining the Soviet empires retained its loyal constituency in Congress and the succession of administrations covering more than forty years. History will probably judge that the ideological struggle that was waged in international organizations and the broadcasts by Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberations and other efforts to get information behind the Iron Curtain were a major factor in the eventual collapse of the Soviet Empire. Efforts to arms and send refugees back into countries firmly held by communist regimes supported by Soviet military and security forces mostly ended in failures reluctantly acknowledged by American advocates of these operations. Some of these operations became embarrassing disasters. A few may retain a place in history as contributing to the ultimate demise of communism. All of these operations were, at the time they were initiated, controversial within the Central Intelligence Agency and within the Departments of State and Defense. But all ultimately required approval of the President, however reluctantly and mysteriously given.

Over roughly a decade -- 1935 to 1945 -- Germany's political and military aggressions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union involved major efforts to influence, manipulate, to use, and sometimes destroy, ethnic and nationality groups -- Poles, Ukrainians, Balts, Moldavians, Croatsians, Albanians and others. In quite different circumstances and with less control than that exercised by Germany, many of the same Eastern European elements became of increasingly intense interest to the US foreign policy community as its awareness of the character of the Soviet threat grew in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

There was, within the Adenauer regime and the intelligence and military advisors that helped shape West Germany national security policy in the postwar period, no interest in "roll back" or "liberation" comparable to the developments in Washington in the same period -- the late 1940s through much of the 1950s. The Germans monitored with interest the powerful radio transmitters erected in Germany and the sudden upsurge in American interest and involvement in refugee groups; but generally the Germans chose to remain aloof. Using refugees to liberate Eastern Europe was not on the German agenda in the late 1940s or 1950s. West German aspirations were in the West -- ensuring that the West would defend Europe, rebuilding political ties with the West, gaining full sovereignty and membership in NATO with German conventional forces along side the French, the British and, above all, the Americans. Before and during WW II, the Germans had found no consensus within the Hitler menage, the Foreign Office and the Eastern experts in the General Staff on how to deal successfully with the ethnic groups and

nationalities. In postwar Europe they were prepared to let the Americans learn the hard way.

US relations with postwar Europe, East and West, and with the Soviet Union were concentrated to a remarkable degree in the hands of a US foreign policy elite that has been covered by autobiographies of the main players. They have also been described extensively and with reasonable objectivity by Evan Thomas in *The Wise Men* and by Burton Hersch, more recently, in *The Old Boys*. While one may debate their respective versions of how this elite performed, there is less room for disagreement over who they were. Frank Wisner, after running a WW II OSS operation in Bucharest as the Soviet moved in and brutally took control, quickly emerged in postwar Washington as the advocate, architect and highly motivated leader of a hastily improvised and massive Cold War effort to encourage the oppressed people of the Soviet empire to rise and throw the Soviet rascals out.

No US President from Truman to Regan seemed unequivocally committed to the idea that, with the Western Alliance in a defensive posture, the covert war could really succeed. But one after another, each accepted the view of the entrenched foreign policy elite that the Cold War required that the US and its allies take the Soviets on in the great gray area of officially not acknowledged and hopefully unattributable clandestine warfare.

Postwar occupied Germany had no shortage of the survivors of every faction of the Reich's Ostpolitik of the 1930s and WW II -- all with well documented records and credentials described in detail in the meticulously kept German records that fell into allied hands. With clear intent to "denazify" the architects of the occupation had assigned guilt to membership and rank within the NSDAP and its affiliated organization. Occupation forces arrived loaded down with guidance on "automatic arrest categories" that immediately put hundreds of thousands of German civilians behind barbed wire. The Court at Nurnberg and "subsequent proceedings" in all four zones and the German denazification courts attempted to add specificity on individual guilt and a veneer of justice to the process. By 1947 the pendulum had swung from the extreme of the Morgenthau Plan For Germany to a gathering move to prepare the way for a sovereign and prosperous Western Germany to join a European anti-Soviet alliance under American leadership. Currency reform that gave West Germany its own currency on June 1948, catapulted West Germany into the Free World economy. The day after the new DM appeared, the Soviets closed the land roads to Berlin from the West.

The Prewar Moscow Connection

Two German diplomats assigned to Moscow, Hsilger and

Jonny von Herarth were close contacts of the principals in
the American EMBassy including George Kennan, Chip Bahlen
GBohlenKennan~AmericanEmbassy

Paris, 14 Dec 1954

" My dear Truman!

In my 30 Nov letter, I brought to your attention particular observations regarding the question of intelligence organizations in Germany, based on new inquiries and reliable documents.

In recent years, the Gehlen organization has achieved preeminent status among these organizations as a result of the integrity of its leadership and its achievements. The Gehlen organization has been operating for several years with the approval and support of the U.S.A. With the emergence of the Federal Republic, the organization's activities have been directed by the Federal government without changing the close relationship to American authorities. As a result of this cooperation there developed a connection between the Gehlen organization and the Blank office. The Gehlen organization's achievements in the areas of military, political-military, and defense policy came to my attention, along with that of other organizations this way. Hence my assessment:

" For some years, the Gehlen organization has provided a near complete picture of the Soviet-occupied zone, as well as extensive documents pertaining to the Soviet satellite states, and of the Soviet Union itself--which provides essential information for future military leaders.

Your proposal to create a military intelligence service is in my view already achieved through the cooperation of the Gehlen organization and the Blank office.

" Regarding Gehlen himself: I have known Gehlen since prior to the war as a particularly capable and noble-charactered General Staff Officer of the best type. He is no one-sided intelligence functionary, rather he emerged from the leadership ranks of the General Staff (until 1942 he was General Staff Officer in the Operations Division under Heusinger and did not become involved with intelligence matters until the middle of 1942 when he assumed command of the "Foreign Army East"). The same applies for Gehlen's military inner circle, who in the age range of 40 -45, are far from being one-side intelligence types, but are general staff officers with the requisite "all round" training.

Your suggestion, to fill the ranks of the military intelligence service or G-2 with "honorable and capable soldiers, not merely with intelligence specialists" has already been achieved.

" You are concerned that the Gehlen organization could be penetrated by the East. I believe that every organization of this kind which

Hans Speidel

letter to

Truman Smith

finds itself in a perpetual "state of war" faces the possibility of infiltration. It solely depends on institutionalizing security measures which can identify any and all attempts to infiltrate it early on and to paralyze them.] It appears to me that these precautions have been taken by the Gehlen organization.

It is not surprising that the Gehlen organization has some critics in the USA along with numerous genuine friends and supporters--the organization credits its existence to the courage of certain american officers--it also has critics in Germany. It has become apparent over time that various internal or external powers want to discredit the organization--either out of envy, ambition, or in terms of Eastern infiltration. In the view of most governing bodies in the Federal Republic, the Gehlen organization is the sole organization which could effectively assume the role of an intelligence service in the Federal Republic. The unrelenting effort to discredit the organization from the East appears to me to be the best testament regarding the value of this service for West Germany, as well as for the West.

In order for you to gain a deeper insight into the Gehlen organization, I would propose that you meet with Gehlen personally during your next trip to Europe. I am convinced that any remaining doubts will be dispelled at that time.

With best wishes and regards.

Yours truly,

BOOK 21

JASCHKE

.formstop
.lines45

August 21, 1988

Dr. Hans-Gerd Jaschke
Dammstr. 3
6115 Muenster
West Germany

Dear Dr. Jaschke,

I am still unable to make firm travel plans for September and early October because we will be moving into a new home outside of Washington that is scheduled for completion in September. In the days ahead, I will attempt to make firm plans. Unfortunately, it does not seem likely that I can be in the Munich area starting September 19th when you will be there. As we get further along I will be in contact with you by telephone and attempt to arrange a mutually convenient meeting. In the meantime, I will attempt to comment on the points you have raised.

Gehlen's book, *Der Dienst*, gives a reasonably accurate account of his contacts with Americans in Germany and in Washington during the period 1945 to 1947. This was the first critical period when his basic concept barely survived. The second critical period in this relationship was in 1948-1949 when the American government took its first careful look at what had evolved in the three years. Once the decision was made to examine the relationship with the Gehlen organization in the broader context of the international situation that developed during this immediate postwar period, the Gehlen organization fairly rapidly became a part of the emergence of West Germany in the Western alliance. It was not easy. Gehlen was a man of truly remarkable persistence, determination and confidence in his own perception of history.

Your reference to "CIC/CIA" is inaccurate and misleading. From the outset, the American officers in contact with Gehlen were military intelligence specialists associated with the interrogation center at Oberuersel which reported directly to the G-2 of the European Command. CIC, the Counter Intelligence Corps, played no significant role at any point in the Gehlen story. Even as the Gehlen organization expanded and moved its headquarters from the Frankfurt area to Pullach, it remained directly under the senior U.S. Army intelligence staff in Heidelberg. I believe that Baun had contacts with CIC in Germany during the year in which Gehlen was in the United States, i.e. 1945-1946. It would be more accurate to depict CIC as one of the centers of opposition to the Gehlen organization. For years it discreetly ran operation designed to established that the

Gehlen organization was penetrated to a degree that defeated the basic US purpose. Its results, which did not include unearthing such cases as Felde, did not, over the years, have a real influence on either Bonn or Washington policies on the Gehlen organization.

Reinhard Gehlen foresaw, in the closing days of WW II, the rapid emergence of a bipolar superpower world and a move toward some form of Western European union under the aegis of the United States. This conviction motivated Gehlen to attempt to salvage the FHO people, their experience and files as assets to be traded off to the West in exchange for Western support of the organization he would assemble early after the cessation of WW II hostilities. Gehlen was a man who knew what he wanted and with astonishing tenacity fought to move in this direction. He was clearly persuasive enough to gain initial support from General Sibert and a few fairly junior US military intelligence officers who spoke German and became staunch supporters with their superiors of Gehlen's offer.

In Washington, Gehlen and the small group of his associates from Fremde Herre Ost were being systematically interrogated regarding their knowledge and experience on the Eastern Front. The year in the US afforded Gehlen and his group some opportunity to view America first-hand and to make a number of contacts in the working levels of Pentagon intelligence. They went to Washington in 1945 and returned to Germany in 1946 without tangible progress in selling Gehlen's basic idea. There were no serious initiatives by senior American officials concerning the future of a revived German intelligence organization during these months in the USA. Gehlen had no real opportunity to advance his ideas to senior officers in the Pentagon. It was simply too early after the war to move a question of this complexity and political sensitivity to senior levels in the Pentagon. CIA was not created until 1947 under the Armed Forces Unification Act. It was not until Gehlen returned to Germany in the summer of 1946 that he was in a position to get on with forming the nucleus of a future service. Gerhard Wessel, left behind in the small Gehlen cadre at Oberuersel in 1945, managed to hold together the hard core of the Gehlen group that had been assembled.

By 1948 the operation "Rusty" initiated under local authority of the European Command had expanded in size and level of activity. It was beginning to pose financial problems and political questions. General Sibert and the small coterie of American intelligence officers which had managed to provide Gehlen with essential support were moving on to other assignments or, in the case of the key German-speaking wartime intelligence specialists, returning to civilian life. But for the first time, the existence and significance of the Gehlen organization was by then getting

attention at the national level in Washington. But until the end of 1948 nothing resembling a policy decision had been even addressed.

The events of the period 1948-1950 followed, in geopolitical terms, the Gehlen scenario. The crisis over Berlin, the outbreak of war in Korea, the sudden blossoming of the Cold War, the creation of NATO, the Adenauer government in Bonn and the opening to West Germany to enter the western alliance all combined to produce the real possibility of the Gehlen organization eventually becoming the central intelligence arm of the new Germany government. Even during these years, there were elements in Bonn and in Washington which had to be persuaded that the interests of both governments would be served by a purposeful agreement of the US to "hold in trust" the Gehlen organization until the Bonn government was prepared to take it over.

Gehlen's description of the "Gentlemen's Agreement" between Sibert and himself undoubtedly reflects conversations he held with General Sibert. But there was almost certainly no formal agreement that had support or understanding at the policy levels of the US Government. Gehlen needed the "Gentlemen's Agreement" as a political and psychological basis for providing leadership and control over an organization that no official status whatsoever. By the time that Gehlen wrote *Der Dienst*, it really didn't matter whether this alleged 1946 agreement was real or a myth. Events had overtaken it. A "gentlemen's agreement" between Bonn and Washington had evolved and was eventually honored by both parties.

Your information on my meeting Gehlen in 1946 is wrong. I was at that time a career officer serving in Heidelberg and later in Vienna with little knowledge of and no contact with "Operation Rusty" run out of Oberursel. I first met Reinhard Gehlen in September 1948 when I was tasked with making an assessment of the operation. Although I remained in uniform as an army colonel until I returned to the United States after the legalization of the Gehlen organization on 1 April 1956, the evolving relationship with the incipient BND had become a matter of carefully considered US intelligence policy looking toward an end to US "trusteeship" and its emergence as the official central intelligence service of the German Federal Republic. In summary, the evolution of the Gehlen organization into the BND and its early support by American intelligence was part of the remarkable transition of Germany, or at least that

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Produktion: WDR, Programmgruppe
Geschichte/Zeitgeschichte
Redaktion: Klaus Liebe

DER GENERAL UND DIE GEHEIMDIENSTE - EIN PORTRÄT ÜBER REINHARD
GEHLEN (= vorläufiger Arbeitstitel)

1. Kurz-Inhaltsangabe

Der Film (45 Minuten) versteht Gehlen nicht so sehr als "Spion des Jahrhunderts" (Cookridge), sondern als historisch-politische Persönlichkeit. Er entfaltet seine Lebensgeschichte bis 1968 als Wechselspiel von persönlicher Biographie und deutscher Zeitgeschichte. Es ist die außergewöhnliche Karriere eines Generalstabsoffiziers, die aufgrund der Eckdaten 1920 (Eintritt in die Reichswehr), 1933 (Machtübernahme Hitlers), 1942 (Chef der FHO), 1945/46 (Verhandlungen mit den Amerikanern), 1946 (Gründung der Organisation Gehlen) und 1955 (Gründung des BND) so nur in Deutschland möglich war. Umgekehrt: In dieser Biographie spiegelt sich deutsche Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts.

Der Film ist so angelegt, daß er, möglichst lebendig und spannend, aber auch nüchtern-sachlich, eine Geschichte erzählt. Sie soll dem Zuschauer ein Stück lebendiger Zeitgeschichte vorführen, sie soll unterhalten, aber auch Nachdenklichkeit erzeugen. Das unterhaltsam-kurzweilige und authentische Moment wird umso stärker zum Ausdruck kommen, je mehr ehemalige Weggefährten bereit sind, ihre Erinnerungen zur Verfügung zu stellen. Den Zuschauer interessiert: Was geht in Gehlen vor, wie ist er als Mensch, wie zwangsläufig sind seine Entwicklungen und Entscheidungen, wie hat er zeitgeschichtliche Entwicklungen gedeutet, auch persönlich verarbeitet? Der Film wird umso langweiliger und trocken-"belehrender", wenn er sich mit Informationen aus zweiter Hand begnügen muß und je mehr der Autor kommentieren muß.

Mit anderen Worten: Mir liegt sehr an einem "persönlichen" Porträt, mir geht es darum, möglichst nahe an den Menschen und die historisch-politische Person des Reinhard Gehlen heranzukommen.

2. Möglicher Film-Ablauf

- Aufhänger: Die Legende Reinhard Gehlen, Frage: Wer ist dieser Mann?
- Rückblicke: Stationen der Biographie
- Kindheit, Jugend in Erfurt und Breslau

- 1920: Eintritt in die Reichswehr
- bis 1942: Entwicklung zum Generalstabsoffizier
- 1942-1945: Chef der Abteilung "Fremde Heere Ost". Konflikte mit dem OKW (Canaris) einerseits, dem RSHA andererseits. Arbeitsweise der Abteilung FHO, Qualität der Prognosen

1945/46 wie kommt es zur Übereinkunft mit den Amerikanern?

- 1946-1955 Organisation Gehlen: Wie arbeitet dieser Dienst, welche persönlichen und politischen Überlegungen veranlassen Gehlen, den Dienst aufzubauen, welche Erwartungen hegen die Amerikaner?
- 1955-1968 BND: Die Bedeutung von "Intelligence" für die Außenpolitik Adenauers. Verhältnis Gehlens zur Politik. Zwei Affären: Der Fall Prof. Kastner und der Fall Felde
- 1968: Umstände des Rücktritts, 1979 verstorben
- zusammenfassende Überlegungen

3. Dramaturgischer Aufbau

- Filmzitate aus vorhandenen Archivmaterialien
- Fundstücke der FHO im Bundesarchiv Koblenz
- Originalschauplätze (z.B. Oberursel, Elendsalm/Schliersee, Pullach)
- Interviews: Ein Politiker, der Gehlen gut kannte, ein Wissenschaftler (Militärhistoriker), ein bis zwei Weggefährten Gehlens, unter Umständen einen amerikanischen Zeitzeugen
- Fotos: Bilderdienste, Bildarchive, wenn möglich auch Fotos aus Privatbesitz

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Gehber Org

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Org drops behind Sov. lines
T.uman considers ultimatum/war

in Germany, offered to fly the agents to drop zones in the Soviet Union. The problem was the fact there were no ^{safe} drop zones, no groups within the Soviet Union to aid the agents once they were on the ground. Another difficulty facing the CIA plan was the documents required by the agents if they were to survive. Each Soviet citizen was required to carry an internal passport or identification paper and these were different for each section of the Soviet Union. He also had to have a labor record, a military record and a party record. Gehlen came to the rescue in regards to the documents. During the war his FHO had learned the Sammelpress printing process used by the Soviets to produce the various documents and had used it extensively to provide the necessary papers for his own ^{FHO} agents. Now he used the secret to produce the documents for the CIA agents.

The Gehlen-Dulles air drops began in 1951. American attempts to aid the Ukrainian nationalists had ^{been} attempted two years earlier by the CIA without the help of the German general's organization/ and while several agents were successfully dropped into the Ukraine the ^{had} losses/ been too high and the cost too great for the results achieved. Dulles was convinced that Gehlen was the key to a air-drop operation. The Nazi general had selected the agents to send in, had picked the drop zones and still insisted that he had part of his World War II

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spy network intact within the Soviet Union although he had not been able to produce any intelligence of importance during the postwar years. Perhaps it was the "do something, do anything" attitude in Washington that swayed Dulles or perhaps it was his firm belief in the ability of the German general, a belief he maintained until the very end, that induced Dulles to start the operation.

The first flight was handled by the USAF using a war-weary C-47 stripped of all insignia and painted black. Lieutenant John Manchester of Grand Island, Nebraska was the copilot on the mission.

"We were asked to volunteer for a reconnaissance flight," Manchester explained, "and since we were all bored with the routine training and supply missions we were handling at the time there were a lot of volunteers. I was delighted to be selected."

Manchester was taken to an airfield in Greece where he met his passengers for the first time. "There were two young men at the field waiting for our plane to arrive. I learned later they were both Russians who had been taken prisoner by the Germans and who had agreed to spy for the U.S. We weren't told much about the operation except that we would be dropping these two agents near Moldavia in the southwest Ukraine. Of course, we were warned we would be flying over Soviet territory and that we might be

attacked by Russian fighters or fired upon by Russian antiaircraft guns. That made me a little nervous but when I thought about those two agents and what they were going to do I forgot about my own problems. I'll be damned if I would have wanted to jump out of that Gooney Bird into the darkness over Russia."

Their trip of seven hundred miles was uneventful although Soviet searchlights tried to locate the plane twice during the flight.

"As we neared the designated drop zone the two agents checked the radio transmitters they were carrying, made certain their pistols were in place and tightened the lines holding their pouches to their belts. I found out later that each of the pouches contained several thousand roubles and gold coins," Manchester said. "They each had a collapsable bicycle, too. When I gave them the signal to jump, the youngest one grinned at me and dove out the door. The second agent didn't even glance my direction. He just followed his buddy into the darkness."

Asked if he knew he was on a CIA mission, Manchester smiled. "Not really but it wouldn't have meant much to me if they had told me I was flying for the CIA. Every agency and military unit went by its initials. The CIA didn't mean to me then what it does now."

The two agents dropped on this flight were F.K. Sarantzev

and A.I. Osmanov, both Russians who had agreed to work for Gehlen and the CIA. It was their first and last mission. They sent three messages back to CIA receiving stations shortly after they landed then were silent. Several weeks later the Soviet Union announced they had caught two American spies, tried them "according to Article 58 of the Soviet Criminal Code" and executed the pair when they were found guilty!

The air drops went from bad to worse during the ensuing months but Dulles insisted they be kept up. Manchester was on another night flight when they were briefed on the wrong drop zone. The three agents they carried that night leaped into the waiting arms of the Russian police. The error in the drop zone coordinates was not found until after Manchester and his crew had returned to base in Greece and an American officer admitted the mistake.

"According to the officer," Manchester said, "the German agent in charge of the mission gave us only the coordinates of the drop zone. No other indication of what city or village it might be near. While we were still on our return flight the German accidentally mentioned the name of a city where the three agents were supposed to be dropped. The American officer having a beer with him knew immediately that the coordinates given us weren't even near the city. When he

confronted the German with this fact, the German quickly left the airfield."

Obviously the Gehlen agent had made an error. Critics of the Gehlen Org said many such "errors" were made on purpose for one reason or another. In this case, however, there was no apparent benefit to the German general for such a mistake. It was carelessness plus Gehlen's obsession about secrecy which prevented the flight crew of the aircraft from verifying the coordinates of the drop zone with known locations on their maps.

Other CIA-Gehlen agents dropped over the Soviet Union became double agents; that is, they betrayed the German general and the American lawyer and relayed information the Soviets provided them. L.K. Kurochkin, a deserter from the Soviet occupation army in Austria, joined Gehlen's organization and was dropped over the Caucasus. He radio^{ed} back information from the oil fields for several months and the German general bragged to his American associates about his "network" in the Caucasus. Unfortunately, his one-man network was disclosed to be a Soviet ruse when an article appeared in a Russian magazine detailing Kurochkin's activities. As soon as he landed after his air drop, the Russian went to the local police and revealed his identity and his mission. The Soviets immediately doubled him and

gave him false information to radio to Gehlen.

There were some successes but they were few. Often it took years to learn that the CIA-Gehlen agents had been caught and executed within a few days of their air drop. Others who seemingly landed without being detected and were accomplishing their assigned missions were later revealed to be Soviet agents and their reports useless. Many of these reports were, however, in the meantime used by the CIA as authentic, forwarded to Washington and were the basis of anti-Soviet planning by political and military officials. There was another reason the air-drop operation was inconclusive. The agents were to act as early warning operators, to warn the Americans that the Soviets were preparing to move their troop into western Europe for all-out war. At that time, the CIA's private army would be alerted to disrupt such a move in anyway possible to give time for U.S. officials to decide on their next step. Nearly thirty years later, when Truman's handwritten journal was made available to researchers, it was revealed that he was considering a full scale war against the Soviet Union during this tense period. In a memorandum dated January 27, 1952 he wrote:

It seems to me that the proper approach now would be an

ultimatum with a 10-day expiration limit, informing Moscow that we intend to blockade the China coast from the Korean border to Indochina and that we intend to destroy every military base in Manchuria by means now in our control - and if there is further interference we shall eliminate any ports or cities necessary to accomplish our purposes. This means all-out war. It means that Moscow, St. Petersburg, Mukden, Vladivostok, Peking, Shanghai, Port Arthur, Darien, Odessa, Stalingrad and every manufacturing plant in China and the Soviet Union will be eliminated.

It is frightening to know that during this precarious period when the president of the United States was seriously considering all-out war against the Soviet Union all that was needed to set off the conflict was the word from a Nazi general stating the Russians were moving troops west! The saving factor was the Soviets made no ^{such effort.} /

There was one incident during the air-drop operation that upset Manchester, the copilot who flew many of the missions. "We were getting ready to take off from a field in Greece one night with four agents when a German arrived from Munich to oversee the operation. Two of the agents knew the German; the other two